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Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias where beliefs formed at an early stage are 
unreasonably sustained even in the face of new information that makes those 
beliefs untenable or at least questionable. In these circumstances, new 
information that does not fit with the earlier-formed beliefs may be ignored, while 
information supporting those beliefs is accepted readily as lending credence to 
them. During 2010 and 2011, Jonathan Lord was employed by the YMCA in New 
South Wales, Australia, until a child disclosed that he had been inappropriate 
touched by Mr Lord. This led to Mr Lord being convicted of 13 representative 
offences including multiple aggravated indecent assault charges and two counts 
of sexual intercourse with a child under 10, relating to 12 children enrolled in the 
YMCA Before and After School Care service. Subsequently, several of the 
children's parents, and some of Mr Lord's YMCA co-workers, gave evidence to 
the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse that 
was conducted in Australia from 2012 to 2017. This study shows how 
confirmation bias may lead to tragic or destructive outcomes in some 
circumstances. The use of discourse analysis in this study has afforded a 'micro 
context' understanding of how Mr Lord's abuse of children associated with the 
YMCA service persisted undetected for more than a year, despite Mr Lord 
breaching YMCA rules and being observed engaging in other questionable 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce my study, and describe the structure 
of this thesis. 
 
My study is about confirmation bias, a cognitive bias where beliefs formed at an 
early stage are unreasonably sustained even in the face of new information that 
makes those beliefs untenable or at least questionable. In these circumstances, 
new information that does not fit with the earlier-formed beliefs may be ignored, 
while information supporting those beliefs is accepted readily as lending 
credence to them. 
 
The study here builds on the work on many distinguished researchers, in 
particular German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (2001, 2004), American 
psychologist Raymond Nickerson (1998), Nobel prizewinners Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman (1974), and Cornell psychology professor Thomas Gilovich 
(Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002). 
 
How confirmation bias leads to errors in decision-making 
 
One specific area where confirmation bias can have tragic or destructive 
consequences is when beliefs are formed on limited data regarding the integrity 
and trustworthiness of another person who is entrusted with the care of a child, 
such as a co-worker or childcare provider. Those initial beliefs may then constrain 
the objective assessment of subsequent information about that other person. 
Individuals who prey on or take advantage of children for their own self-
gratification often become very adept at promoting themselves as trustworthy, 
thereby lulling work colleagues and children's parents into a false sense of 
security. A difficulty that arises in identifying and assessing confirmation bias, 
even though it is highly prevalent, is that each situation is unique and it is 




• before all relevant information has been received and considered, our 
unconscious is already formulating the basis for a decision using the 
information to hand so far, and is establishing its own 'ground rules' about 
what further information may be deemed useful or not useful; 
 
• good decision making requires the logical and rigorous assessment of all 
relevant information, to ensure that fallacies and unsupported information 
do not inform or influence decision-making; 
 
• when we are under pressure to make decisions quickly, biases like 
confirmation bias are more likely to affect the outcome; 
 
• 'keeping an open mind' means giving careful consideration to all 
information received right up to the time when a decision must be made, 
and always being alert to the possibility of bias; 
 
• in some cases, confirmation bias is almost impossible for an individual 
decision-maker to overcome: robust decision-making strategies are 
required to avoid outcomes being affected by bias. 
 
A common type of decision-making used to study confirmation bias is the 
decision-making of jurors. For example, a jury member may form an early belief 
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused person and may hold to that belief 
despite later information supporting the opposite conclusion. However, in 
Australia it is not permitted to interview jurors after a trial, and so research into 
confirmation bias affecting jurors is mainly conducted in other countries or using 
mock juries. The widely varying rules that affect legal processes in other countries 
may call into question our ability to apply that research to Australia, and mock 
juries are inevitably artificial constructs that may not reliably represent real-life 
situations. Nonetheless, we have a reasonable basis now to believe that some 
specific circumstances can tend to bias jury decision-making, such as when a 
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defendant is on trial for more than one charge (Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins & 
Martschuk, 2016, pp.46-7). 
 
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Institutional Responses to Child 
Sexual Abuse 2012-17 
 
In this thesis, I am wanting to show situations where confirmation bias and its 
operationalisation is found in real life, influencing decision making and leading to 
negative outcomes.  The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child 
Sexual Abuse ("Royal Commission") was established in November 2012, and ran 
hearings and conducted meetings with victims of child sexual abuse over a period 
of more than 4 years. The Royal Commission delivered its final report on 15 
December 2017. A comprehensive description of the Royal Commission's terms 
of reference, activities and outputs is contained in Appendix 1 of this thesis. 
 
The first two case studies conducted by the Royal Commission related to the 
conduct of two men, Steven Larkins and Jonathan Lord, who each held trusted 
positions where they had access to young children. Larkins and Lord were 
responsible for the abuse of multiple children, and both were sentenced to time 
in jail for their offending. The relevance of these case studies to my research 
arises from the clear evidence of confirmation bias affecting the decision making 
of co-workers of the offenders and parents of the abused children. Very often co-
workers of Mr Larkins and Mr Lord failed to see warning signs, perhaps due to 
their pre-existing beliefs regarding the offenders' professional commitment to 
children's welfare. In Mr Lord's case, co-workers noted his apparent commitment 
and "enthusiasm" for child care, that led to him being trusted by workers and 
parents alike. 
 
Parents dealing with Mr Lord during his time at the YMCA in Carringbah were 
also misled by how much he was liked by their child or children, and his 
willingness to go the extra mile to engage with the children and support their 
interests – acts that we might now describe as 'overt helpfulness' raising the 
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spectre of grooming. Even when Mr Lord's behaviour was clearly outside the rules 
of the institution that employed him – such as being the sole carer present on bus 
during trips with the children, taking them on trips in his own car, and offering to 
babysit the children outside of his work duties – that was not enough to raise the 
alarm. Some parents later realised that Mr Lord had been grooming them as 
much as he had been grooming their children. 
 
The transcripts of witnesses' evidence to the Royal Commission reflect (in the 
main) a genuine attempt by witnesses to describe their experiences and 
knowledge of matters relevant to the commission's inquiry. Much of the evidence 
heard by the Royal Commission was harrowing, as individuals who were sexually 
abused recounted incidents of abuse and the impacts of those incidents, parents 
described their distress and confusion about what happened to their child, and 
co-workers of perpetrators described how a person they trusted was later found 
to be engaged in child abuse activities such as grooming, possessing and 
distributing child abuse material, and incidents of direct sexual abuse against the 
children and young persons who they were employed to protect. The commission 
also heard from leaders and managers of institutions, some of whom did not have 
personal first-hand knowledge of the abuses, but who could speak about policies 
and how specific incidents were handled within their respective organisations. 
 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the case study regarding Mr Lord, and a list 
of relevant witnesses can be found in Appendix 2. The transcripts of these 
witnesses' evidence are revealing in relation to the formation of an initial belief 
about the offender, and the persistence of that belief. Moreover, they reveal 
factors that might in other circumstances have called the initial beliefs into 
question, and provide some insight into why they did not. A limitation of this study 
is that it is wholly reliant on the evidence given by the identified witnesses to the 
Royal Commission, and therefore some relevant context is unknown. 
 
It is sobering to realise that during a period of just over two years in his trusted 
role as a child care worker at the YMCA, Jonathan Lord sexually abused at least 
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12 children. In 2013, Mr Lord was convicted of 13 offences including multiple 
aggravated indecent assault charges and two counts of sexual intercourse with 
a child under 10 (Royal Commission, 2014, p.4). However, these were 
representative charges and do not reflect the full magnitude of the offending. In 
the case of one child, referred to by the Royal Commission as "AO", his mother 
"AN" gave the following evidence of her personal beliefs: 
 
AN.29  I trusted and believed that if Jonathan Lord was a supervisor at the 
YMCA, he was more than qualified. 
AN.30  … In around December 2010 Jonathan Lord started babysitting 
[AO] every Saturday. I would 
AN.31  pay him $100 for the day. I now know that Jonathan indecently 
assaulted [AO] the very first time that he 
AN.32  babysat him and that the abuse occurred every Saturday thereafter 
until Jonathan stopped babysitting 
AN.33  [AO] in October 2011. 
 
Research purpose, tasks and methodology 
 
Considering all of the above, and that the main purpose of the study is to describe 
confirmation bias and illustrate its operation with the help of discourse analysis of 
witness statements in a real-life situation, the research objectives are: 
 
1. To describe the theoretical background related to confirmation bias: 
Human Biases and Cognitive Heuristics; 
2. To understand the meaning of confirmation bias and how it is 
operationalised; 
3. To identify relevant statements of parents of sexually abused children, 
and co-workers of Mr Lord, using discourse analysis;  
4. To demonstrate how confirmation bias can influence decision making 




For present purposes I have regarded the Royal Commission reports of 
witnesses' evidence as evincing 'real-life' material for discourse analysis, from 
which beliefs and meanings related to this topic may be distilled. 
 
The research question is how confirmation bias is represented within witnesses' 
evidence in a real-life context. This phenomenon is researched by considering 
the beliefs of the perpetrator's co-workers and the victims' parents in logical 
categories (chapter 5). The discursive methodology helps to reveal the influential 
role of individual subjectivity – i.e., confirmation biases informing and influencing 
decision making – in real-life situations that may lead to tragic or destructive 
consequences. 
 
Structure of this thesis 
 
Any study of a specific bias needs to be viewed in the context of human biases 
and cognitive heuristics generally. While many people may regard biases 
negatively, they play a very important role in our unconscious decision-making. 
Without biases we might not have survived as a species. For example, a natural 
bias towards the possibility that a long, thin 'snaky' object is a snake is more likely 
to inform a life-saving decision to run away from that object than if additional time 
is taken to decide if it is a snake or a stick. In that specific example we are 
probably not engaging a confirmation bias, but different biases can have some 
similar characteristics. 
 
To provide context for my focus on confirmation bias, the next chapter (chapter 
2) is a short introduction to human biases and cognitive heuristics. This is 
intended to establish a context for Chapter 3, where I focus on confirmation bias. 
Chapter 4 addresses the methodology employed in this study, and Chapter 5 
discusses the analysis that I have conducted using a discursive approach. Finally, 




Chapter 2 – Briefly About Human Biases and Cognitive 
Heuristics 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the subject of human biases and 
cognitive heuristics broadly, attempting to illustrate and explain the main types of 
biases and heuristics that affect our decision-making and behaviours. I have also 
included a section on informal fallacies. Including these fallacies may be 
controversial, but some modern researchers in this area make a strong case for 
representing informal fallacies as heuristic 'paraschemes' that affect decision 
making (Cummings, 2014, p.5). 
 
Gigerenzer and Bright (2009, p.136) propose that a hypothetical "grand planner" 
might have had three alternative options to consider when designing the optimal 
human mind: 
 
• Perfect memory, so that all previous experiences become a guide to future 
actions. 
 
• Highly developed processing ability to make accurate decisions based on 
available data. 
 
• A mind that can make lightning fast inferences based on a limited set of 
data. 
 
However, previous experiences could only be a guide to future actions in a 
predictable world, and even the fastest 'processing unit' requires time to consider 
all the possible alternatives in a situation and choose the most suitable one. That 
leaves inference-based decision-making, which is of course exactly what we 
have available to us. While sometimes our inferences are spectacularly wrong, 




Any thinking process that involves inferences or subjective reasoning is likely to 
fall within the ambit of biases. Biases often involve prejudice developed over time 
due to cultural influences or personal experiences, and a narrow definition of 
biases might describe them as psychological responses that favour certain 
outcomes over others based on pre-existing preferences. Sometimes we refer to 
biases as 'cognitive biases' to reflect how they arise from cognitive rules or 
shortcuts known as cognitive heuristics. 
 
In this thesis, I suggest defining cognitive heuristics as strategic mental processes 
to facilitate timely decision-making using limited data. These mental processes 
are derived mainly from our experiences (Ross, 2014, p.33). This means that how 
a person unconsciously deals with a situation in the future is likely to be informed 
by how a similar situation unfolded in his or her past. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that cognitive heuristics and cognitive biases are 
not the same, although heuristics are involved in creating biases and in turn are 
shaped by biases. Both biases and cognitive heuristics play a significant role in 




Although most of us will readily acknowledge that we sometimes express bias 
towards a particular person or a particular outcome, we are all largely oblivious 
to the full extent of the biases and intuitive leaps that influence almost every 
aspect of our daily lives. We may believe that our decisions are always rationally 
considered, even though dispassionate analysis of a decision-making process 
will typically reveal otherwise. Many factors are involved here, some more within 
our conscious control than others. 
 
It is widely accepted that we often perceive bias negatively, particularly when we 
feel "biased against", but in theory it is a neutral process, neither negative nor 
positive. That said, the outcome of a decision informed by bias could in practice 
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be very negative or very positive depending on how the decision plays out. 
Lauwereyns (2010, p.xiv) describes bias as follows: 
 
"bias is a core brain mechanism that attaches different weights to various 
information sources, prioritizing some cognitive representations at the 
expense of others." 
 
Seen in this way, bias is simply a method to evaluate data. However, influences 
on the formation and operation of biases should not be ignored as they can 
significantly affect how bias manifests itself in a particular situation. Put simply, 
biases inform expectations based on our pre-formed beliefs about what is most 
preferred, but reality can and does intrude in the form of external stimuli affecting 
our perceptions and the implementation of the bias. In this way, our biases and 
sensitivity to stimuli act in concert (Lauwereyns, 2010, p.79). 
 
The pursuit of happiness? 
 
Even if biases are not always negative factors, a valid question remains: why 
have biases evolved to be so integral to our behaviour, often bypassing available 
logic that would sometimes produce a better result for us? Lauwereyns (2010, 
pp.83-84) suggests this might be associated with the "pursuit of happiness", and 
the idea that happiness could be the "systemic goal of informed decision making" 
even though that satisfaction may be short-lived and "explicable as computational 
processes gone awry." Other researchers have proposed that biases evolved as 
a risk or error management strategy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, Haselton & 
Buss, 2000, Haselton & Galperin, 2013, Nettle, 2004, Yamagishi et al., 2007, and 
Johnson, 2009, all as cited in Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler & Haselton, 2013, 
p.474). Johnson et al. give the example of how biases might be more likely to 
lead us to mistake a stick for a snake (a "harmless" error) than to mistake a snake 
for a stick (a potentially fatal error). Similarly, if we are conscious of the possibility 
of being run down by a car when crossing the road, we are less likely to die in 
that way even though the consistent vigilance comes at a cognitive cost. The 
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rationality of this approach is described in this way, referring here to cognitive 
bias as 'behavioral bias': (Johnson et al., p.476) 
 
"To a third party, this behavioral bias may appear to be ‘economically 
irrational’ because we are consistently wasting time worrying about an event 
that rarely happens, but if it helps us to maximize our chance of survival 
(and reproduction), it is ‘adaptively rational’. In other words, our behavior is 
not tuned to fit a model of expected payoffs, but a model of expected fitness. 
For this reason, a behavior that seems 'biased' would not seem biased if we 
had complete information about the consequences of those actions for 
survival and reproduction." 
 
Therefore, despite their apparent irrationality cognitive biases can lead to 
outcomes that improve species survival. Johnson et al. (2013, p.478) suggest 
that bias-informed strategies make sense because they most accurately address 
"the asymmetric costs of false-positive and false-negative errors made under 
uncertainty." 
 
Happy outcomes? Not so much 
 
Sometimes we can identify how a bias has formed, such as if we have won Lotto 
using a specific set of numbers and feel more confident using those same 
numbers after that. While this example of biased confidence ignores the reality 
that every number set has the same probability of winning Lotto, the general 
principle that a successful formula should be repeated is deeply entrenched in 
the human psyche. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as very often a run of 
successes in a non-random scenario can indeed be attributed to a pattern of 
behaviour based on earlier success. We can imagine this working for our 
forebears on an African savanna, as they honed their method of catching 
wildebeest for food. Eventually the method would inform a powerful bias, 
overwhelming any stray thought of trying a different method. However, a change 
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in the environment might then have catastrophic results, as the old bias failed to 
produce the same outcomes as were previously enjoyed. 
 
Another great challenge is the manner in which a belief once formed becomes 
hard to dislodge. This is one manifestation of confirmation bias, and is a lot more 
common than most people realise. In some cases, an individual will cling 
tenaciously to a belief even after he or she has been shown conclusive proof that 
the belief is erroneous. However, it is not necessarily irrational or senseless for 
us to conduct ourselves subconsciously in this way: (Kahan et al., 2017, p.77) 
 
"It is perfectly rational, from an individual welfare perspective, for individuals 
to engage with decision-relevant science in a manner that promotes 
culturally or politically congenial beliefs… [because] forming a belief at odds 
with the one that predominates on it within important affinity groups of which 
such a person is a member could expose him or her to an array of highly 
unpleasant consequences (Kahan, 2012)." 
 
However, the reality that some errors do become consequential is a reasonable 
basis to suggest that encouraging people to independently review the available 
evidence and reach their own conclusions is prudent, even if it may be an uphill 
battle to get them to do this.  
 
Broad categorisations of biases 
 
Considering biases more generally, Boyd and Richerson (1985, pp.134-5, as 
cited in Enfield, 2014, p.25) have proposed that biases fall into one or more of 
three categories: 
 




• indirect: individual advantage depends upon other group members 
interpreting the relevant conduct and identifying the individual as part of 
the group. 
 
• frequency-dependent: behaviours that are common within the group are 
copied (even if they are not necessarily advantageous). 
 
In practice, it may be difficult to identify the bias or biases responsible for specific 
individual behaviour at a point in time, but an essential feature of all frequency-
dependent biases is that they are connected to the transmission of cultural 
information within the group. Some direct and indirect biases that influence group 
behaviour are also definable as transmission biases.  
 
Context biases and content biases 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, it may be more useful to distinguish between 
'content biases' and 'context biases'. Context biases a.k.a. 'model-based biases' 
are also transmission biases because they involve transmission of cultural 
information (Boudry, Blancke & Pigliucci, 2014, p.5). A good illustration of a 
context bias is the situation where a teenager emulates the dress style of a pop 
idol such as Justin Bieber, influenced by Mr Bieber's dress sense because it is 
popular within the teenager's personal context. 
 
Emulation of a celebrity or someone who is seen as important within the group 
implicates a context bias more specifically known as 'prestige bias' (Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005, p.124). Whether dressing like Mr Bieber is a good strategy depends 
on the individual's objectives in life, but for a teenager it is possible that success 
might be measured in terms of being recognised by one's peers as committed to 
the Bieber 'look'. This kind of bias may be direct or indirect, and does not 




Another form of context bias is 'conformist bias', which leads us to adopt – i.e., 
conform with – the views that are most strongly held by others around us. 
Conformist bias therefore leads us to emulate beliefs or behaviours that are 
common within our personal context. Richerson and Boyd (2005, p.120) note that 
"conformity is not just simple cultural influence", but instead involves 
unconsciously choosing a model of behaviour according to the frequency of a 
specific trait. Conformist bias may also be direct or indirect or both, as the relevant 
belief or behaviour may be perceived as benefitting the individual and the group 
in varying degrees, but what is critical here is that the conformist bias is 
frequency-dependent. However, we cannot assume that all individuals in a group 
that exhibits conformist bias will necessarily be conformists, as some "maverick" 
members may not respond to behavioural frequency in the group (Efferson, 
Lalive, Richerson, McElreath & Lubell, 2008, p.56). This is significant because it 
suggests that while conformity is important to survival, some degree of 
nonconformity is tolerable and perhaps even serves a valuable purpose. 
 
Unlike context biases, content biases such as confirmation bias build on our 
innate mental model of how our world is constructed, including the content of our 
world and our intuitions (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007, as cited in Boudry, Blancke & 
Pigliucci, 2014, p.5). These intuitions are typically influenced by 'personality 
factors' that increase or decrease an individual's propensity to adopt beliefs or 
behave in a particular way (Enfield, 2014). At times it appears as though a war is 
raging between science and our intuition, as new discoveries challenge our 
'commonsense' understanding of the world. However, that 'commonsense' often 
prevails for a long period beyond the emergence of a competing scientific 
paradigm, because science inevitably struggles in its path to consistent certainty, 
and also because intuition is immediately at hand while scientific truth is far less 





How biases affect groups 
 
Significant experiences relevant to a group as a whole are more likely to be 
transmitted within the group than isolated personal experiences that are only 
relevant to one individual group member or to a small sub-group. This dynamic 
was sharply evident from divergent reactions to the outcome of the infamous O.J. 
Simpson arrest and trial that preoccupied the United States for much of 1994 and 
1995. In relation to the verdict in that trial, Brigham and Wasserman (1999, 
p.1368) comment: 
 
"Because people view the world through the prism of their own experiences, 
and because Whites and African Americans have remarkably different 
experiences when it comes to discrimination and special treatment as a 
result of race, it is no wonder that the perceptions of the two races can be 
remarkably different... It is these life experiences which may condition a 
juror’s view of the evidence, and thus influence the verdict." 
 
Brigham and Wasserman (1999, p.1368) suggest that individual life experiences 
are typically formed through engagement in a specific group or community, so 
that less malleable individuals in the group or community become role models for 
more malleable individuals and "attitudes are passed from person to person." 
 
Biases as a force for good 
 
Rather than rejecting bias, Lauwereyns (2010, p.14) suggests that it "deserves to 
be exonerated, polished, and used properly... as a fundamental property of 
human thinking, perceiving, and decision making." 
 
Lauwereyns (2010, p.200) says he cannot imagine a world without bias, because 
our "fears and desires" give meaning to life. However, biases are capable of being 
managed in many situations, and in particular the ability to bring biases into "our 
conscious awareness, allows us to apply them more carefully, more 
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systematically, and more successfully" (Lauwereyns, 2010, p.228). This 
sentiment is echoed by Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler and Haselton (2013, p.480), 
who see error management theory – described as "a unifying framework for 
understanding decisions made under uncertainty, wherever there are asymmetric 
costs of false-positive and false-negative errors" – as a way to mitigate damaging 
errors while also allowing "the risks that have driven remarkable feats of human 
endeavour." 
 
Biases and cognitive heuristics 
 
The phenomena of biases and cognitive heuristics are not mutually exclusive. In 
fact, our cognitive heuristics are frequently informed by our biases, with a 
consequential effect on our unconscious decision-making. 
 
Confirmation bias a.k.a. confirmatory bias is a cognitive bias but also works in 
conjunction with cognitive heuristics. Formation of a belief, for example that a 
person is honest, may be motivated by the perception of specific stimuli, but how 
that belief is then implemented heuristically affects the influence of the bias in a 
particular situation. Plous (1993, p.233) suggests that the label 'confirmation bias' 
"usually refers to a preference for information that is consistent with a hypothesis 
rather than information which opposes it." Klayman and Ha (1987, p.220, as cited 
in Plous) identify how confirmation biases arise from a "positive test strategy" 
which, "like any all-purpose heuristic ... is not always optimal..." 
 
The effect of confirmation bias is that once a belief has informed the rule-base of 
a heuristic process, subsequent information may be interpreted or preferred in a 
manner that is consistent with the belief. For example, if a juror in a criminal trial 
forms a belief as to the defendant's innocence early in the trial, that juror may pay 
greater attention to subsequent evidence supporting the defendant's innocence 
than to evidence supporting guilt. In analysing this situation, we may consider 
that the juror has become motivated towards favouring evidence of innocence. 
From a cognitive perspective, the juror may be unconsciously using an availability 
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heuristic – a type of cognitive heuristic that prefers the most easily recalled 
information – to determine the value of the evidence, which potentially has the 
effect of preserving the bias if the most easily recalled information is information 
supporting innocence. You can see from this example that the interplay between 
biases and cognitive heuristics can be complex, and sometimes the effective 
agent cannot be determined. 
 
2.2. Cognitive heuristics 
 
You have probably at some stage played the popular fund-raising game where 
people are given the opportunity to guess the number of jellybeans in a jar (this 
can also be done with Smarties or M&Ms or other lollies) usually in return for a 
small donation that goes towards the prize for guessing the correct number. My 
experience is that individual ability to estimate the number varies widely in these 
games, but most people will nonetheless make an attempt. Many of those 
individuals will then express confidence that they have a chance of winning – up 
until the jellybeans are counted out. Although a few people will make a 
determined effort to calculate the number of jellybeans, most will simply write the 
first number that comes into their head relying on their 'intuition'. Intuition does 
not require conscious reasoning. 
 
Any cognitive process that we use to unconsciously find an answer or solve a 
problem may be referred to as a 'cognitive heuristic'. The term 'heuristic' 
distinguishes the process from a more conventional (typically slower) process of 
computing the correct or most accurate answer where that can be done – i.e., 
where all the information required to make an accurate determination is available 
– although we tend to instinctively use heuristics even if that information is 
available. For example, if you are attending a conference and someone asks you 
how many people are in the room, you could stand on a chair and count the 
number of heads you see, but many people will simply make an estimate based 
on an intelligent guess. For most purposes that intelligent guess will be adequate, 
but if you ask 10 attendees the same question you will almost certainly get 10 
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different responses. This level of inaccuracy would not be acceptable if, for 
example, the head count was being used to justify a funding application. 
Moreover, our prior knowledge such as how many people attended the previous 
year's conference might bias us towards a greater or lesser estimate for the 
current event. This is a good example of how biases and cognitive heuristics, 
while different, can work in concert to affect an outcome. 
 
Some writers argue that the word heuristic is ambiguous, as its meaning has 
changed over time and it has been used to denote diverse concepts (e.g., Evans, 
2009, p.36, as cited in Chow, 2014, p.978). Historically, Simon (1990, p.11, as 
quoted in Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008, p.207), proposed that heuristics are 
"methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions with modest amounts of 
computation." Implicit in this definition is the notion that some potentially relevant 
information will not be taken into account, and that the decision-making will be 
faster on account of the reduced computation time. 
 
However, I might take issue with the word "satisfactory" in Simon's definition, as 
clearly some heuristic outcomes are far from that. Furthermore, a "modest 
amount" of computation will in some cases be virtually none, perhaps resting 
entirely on one factor (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, pp.460-3). My own 
working definition of cognitive heuristics is: 
 
"Strategic mental processes to facilitate timely decision-making using 
limited data." 
 
While making decisions based on incomplete information may sometimes be 
dangerous, our heuristic response can be an excellent starting point. It is 
surprising how often that heuristic response turns out to be the best answer. 
Allowing our cognitive heuristics to guide us in this way can often reduce the effort 
that would otherwise be required to reach useful conclusions. For example, if you 
receive a burn from touching a hot stove element you will probably be more 
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vigilant next time you are cooking without giving any conscious thought to the 
previous incident (Ross, 2014, p.33). 
 
However, while keeping ourselves safe from hot stove elements and other 
dangers remains important for modern homo sapiens, it is sometimes problematic 
for us that our cognitive heuristics are still operating in much the same way they 
have for many millennia without an evolved capacity to identify situations when 
they should switch off. For example, Milliman (1986, p.288) found that restaurant 
patrons exposed to fast music ate their meals significantly faster than patrons 
exposed to slow music. In Milliman's study, this had the consequence that the 
"slow-tempo" patrons spent nearly 50% more on drinks than the "fast-tempo" 
patrons. Next time you are in a restaurant, ask yourself whether the background 
music might be having an effect on how long you are taking to eat your meal and 
whether the restaurant owner might be trying to sell more drinks! 
 
In situations where we must act quickly, cognitive heuristics typically do most of 
the heavy lifting. A good example is our 'fight-or-flight' instinct, where there is 
insufficient time for us to make a considered decision. At that moment of serious 
and immediate threat, our cognitive heuristics – informed by our life experiences 
up to that time – spring into action and (we hope) take us automatically to a place 
of safety. 
 
Satisficing versus maximising 
 
Humans and most animals are programmed to judge situations inferentially rather 
than optimise responses to stimuli, unless specific circumstances and the 
creature's mental abilities support a more systematic process (Chase, Hertwig & 
Gigerenzer, 1998; Hertwig & Herzog, 2009, pp.670-1; Stiegler & Gaba, 2015, 
pp.133-4). Simon (1959, pp.262-3) uses the terms 'satisficing' and 'maximizing' 
respectively, to distinguish a good enough response – based on aspiration level 
– from the best response. This is, in effect, an argument against reliance upon 




While rational choice may be our preferred option for decision-making, Simon's 
theory posits that "maximizing is too hard for us", and that our needs are typically 
satisfied by ignoring probabilistic comparisons and instead preferring the first 
option that satisfies our requirements (Byron, 2005, pp.312-3). This has been 
expressed, by way of example, as us being satisfied when the proverbial 
haystack yields the first needle that is sharp enough, rather than demanding the 
best needle in the haystack (March & Simon, 1958/1993, as cited in Hertwig & 
Herzog, 2009, p.671). Similarly, in our quest for a life partner it may be more 
practicable to accept a few faults rather than wait for the most compatible man or 
woman. The alternative, that we approach all decision-making from a utilitarian 
perspective – e.g., finding, from those available, the best needle or the most 
compatible mate – requires us to attach "definite pay-offs" to every possible 
outcome of a decision (Simon, 1955, pp.103-4). 
 
By settling for 'good enough' decisions, humans can choose from a "richer set of 
properties of the real world" (Smith, 1979, p.498). In this context, good enough is 
not just a consequence of our cognitive limitations, but also relates to the 
requirements of the task at hand (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009, p.108). Such 
requirements vary dynamically – reflecting the 'aspirational level' at a moment in 
time – as the individual engaged in the task adapts to the difficulty of the task and 
how easily he or she can identify suitable responses (Simon, 1955, p.111). This 
means that rather than continuing the task until every possibility is identified and 
evaluated, we accept the 'good enough' response in hand. 
 
This human ability to produce and adopt a rough, good enough answer quickly is 
a vital aspect of our efficient functioning as an adaptive organism. There is simply 
not enough time in many instances to process even the available information and 
compute a response that can be empirically justified in some way. In this situation, 
we are in much the same position as the female peacock trying to choose a mate. 
Although it is not entirely clear why female peacocks prefer males that have more 
spectacular tail feathers, that preference is a good example of cognitive heuristics 
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at work: it would be impossible for the female peacock to evaluate all the 
individual characteristics that make for a good mate, so instead she instinctively 
engages in satisficing, basing her mate selection decision on the visual 
appearance her suitor's tail such as how many 'eye-spots' it has (Petrie & 
Halliday, 1994, pp.214-6). Where human or animal cognitive capacity to solve the 
complex problem of finding a good mate is "very small compared with the size of 
the problem", the optimal answer may be to adopt a practical solution where 
pragmatism substitutes for strict rationality (Simon, 1957, p.198, as cited in 
Barros, 2010, p.459). In this way, satisficing can be regarded as a type of 
'bounded rationality' (Gigerenzer, 2004, p.65). 
 
As I write this chapter I am engaged in satisficing. While my aspiration is to 
produce a comprehensive and well-thought-out discussion of the subject, the 
reality is that many factors conspire to prevent the most optimal outcome. When 
I search "cognitive heuristics" in Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com), I 
find there are more than 9,000 results (9,110 as at 4 June 2017) and the 
conventional Google search system produces even more: 49,200 results. That's 
a lot of data. 
 
If I were to read all 9,110 articles identified in Google Scholar at the rate of 10 
articles each day, that would take me 2.5 years. The compromise, that I adopt 
instinctively and to some degree consciously, is to use the sources available to 
me to identify writers who appear to stand out as leaders in the field, and follow 
the breadcrumbs they have laid in order to gain a good enough understanding of 
the subject for present purposes. Like the female peacock I look (metaphorically) 
for the fanciest tail feathers proximate to me because my mental processes have 
concluded that this is the most efficient way to produce a chapter like this in a 
reasonable time-frame. I hasten to add that I try hard to base my assertions on 
plausible theories, even though I cannot possibly find every morsel of data that 





Solving problems quickly and efficiently 
 
When humans were primarily hunter-gathers, our ability to roughly estimate the 
distance between ourselves and an animal we were hunting may have been the 
difference between having food to eat or starving to death. The dynamics of 
trapping a wild beast seldom allow time to carry out careful measurements and 
calculations, or to refer to the wealth of human knowledge about the best ways 
to undertake this task. Instead, our forebears relied upon the hunting skills passed 
down by their elders, and on their innate abilities. Although nowadays we would 
prefer to be seen as rational purveyors of our learning, always acting consciously 
rather than instinctively, the reality is that almost all tasks we do in life – even 
making major decisions, like buying a house or choosing a life partner – are 
undertaken or aided by unconscious mental processes that we are not wholly 
aware of. 
 
Without these unconscious mental processes, we would have to identify and 
weigh all relevant factors for every task, calculating the statistical likelihood of 
one or other decision leading to a specific outcome, and evaluating the costs and 
benefits of all possible outcomes, even though we do not have the memory 
capacity or cognitive ability to process all of this in real time (Johnson et al., 2013, 
p.476). Achieving survival despite these "biological limitations" has required that 
we evolve a smarter way to tackle this mammoth exercise. 
 
Russell and Norvig (1995, p.94, as cited in Walton, 2010, p.163) suggest that 
heuristics were originally regarded as "problem-solving techniques" and later as 
"rules of thumb that domain experts could use to generate good solutions without 
exhaustive search." On this basis, we might say that whereas biases typically 
give effect to simplistic pre-existing preferences or aversions, cognitive heuristics 
are more sophisticated mechanisms to compute solutions in the absence of 
comprehensive data. However, both biases and cognitive heuristics are shaped 
by context and prior experiences to inform a unified scheme that is both finely 
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tuned and omnipresent. All day every day my biases and cognitive heuristics are 
quietly working away in the background. 
 
My (limited) ability to catch a ball – a simple, everyday task that most of us can 
do if the ball is not too fast – relies on cognitive heuristics that automatically 
estimate the trajectory of the ball and where it is going to land. The unconscious 
processing capability that enables us to translate visual stimuli into real-time 
movements – a capability that humans share with most other predatory creatures 
– is so natural to us that we seldom give it much thought. It is, however, a 
remarkable capability in terms of its speed and efficiency that cannot be matched 
by any computer so far designed by humankind. 
 
Our mental search processes usually stop working when we instinctively consider 
that we have enough data in hand to answer the problem at hand (Barros, 2010, 
p.465). In the current era of 'big data', this heuristic phenomenon means that our 
estimations can be wildly wrong because we are relying on a very small sample 
of all relevant data. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that our adaptability is 
coming to the rescue. For example, in relation to our ability to determine the 
veracity of online data, Metzger and Flanagin (2013, p.214, citing Metzger, 2010) 
suggest that where we have neither the time nor the cognitive resources to 
undertake a systematic review of data produced by an online search, we may 
instead "invoke a diversity of heuristics to evaluate credibility, loosely titled 
reputation, endorsement, consistency, self-confirmation, expectancy violation, 
and persuasive intent." These heuristics – that collectively we may call 'credibility 
heuristics' – probably derive from the conjunction of existing capabilities, which 
exemplifies the way that multiple heuristics can work together to optimise decision 
making (Metzger & Flanagin; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, as cited in Metzger & 
Flanagin). 
 
However, there will always be situations when our cognitive heuristics will lead 
us into the swamp if we let them. This requires us to adopt new strategies, based 
on understanding our cognitive heuristics, compensating for their shortcomings 
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and developing their strengths (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013, p.218). For humans, 
the use of such strategies may be regarded as an essential life skill. In particular, 
the engagement of a cognitive heuristic as an automatic response to stimuli may 
be mediated by our "awareness of a potential influence" such as where we 
consciously seek to avoid a particular stereotype (Bargh, 2014, pp.12-13). Bargh 
(p.13) comments: 
 
"One cannot be aware of the actual occurrence of accessibility or 
stereotypic influences because of the fast, effortless, and immediate (i.e., 
preconscious) way in which those mental structures capture and interpret 
relevant environmental input. Nonetheless, through education and other 
consciousness-raising techniques, one can become aware that one might 
be influenced." 
 
A good example of a situation where "consciousness-raising techniques" may 
help us is when we are undertaking a task that requires us to focus our attention 
on a specific activity. Inattentional blindness is a well-known phenomenon where 
focusing on one activity can result in failure to see a non-salient feature or event 
even though it is in plain sight. In a study by Simon and Chabris (1999, pp.1066-
9), subjects were asked to watch a video recording of a ball game and mentally 
keep track of the number of ball passes by a nominated team. After about 45 
seconds of play, a person dressed as a gorilla walked through the area of play, 
but subsequently 46% of those present did not recall seeing the gorilla at all (this 
was the average of various test conditions). In another study, 60% of radiologists 
given x-rays to review failed to see that the patients' collarbones were missing 
(Potchen, 2006, as cited in Drew, Vo & Wolfe). In their own study, Drew, Vo and 
Wolfe inserted a gorilla image into chest x-rays, then asked radiologists to click 
on lung nodules that appear in the x-rays as small white ovals. Only 4 of the 24 
radiologist participants reported seeing the gorilla (p.1850). Drew, Vo and Wolfe 
(p.1852) conclude that the problem arose because the radiologists were focused 




A force for good and bad 
 
Our cognitive heuristics are still at work even if we are not under any pressure to 
make a quick decision. This is partly because we are innately inclined to use 
cognitive heuristics even when other processes are available, and also because 
we are generally overconfident about our innate ability to assess data and reach 
conclusions. In particular, as Simon (1955, 1959, 1979) identifies, we are very 
poor at estimating probability. However, it is important to appreciate the difference 
between the operation of cognitive heuristics and the impact of 'motivational 
factors' on our decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p.1130). Tversky 
and Kahneman suggest that motivational factors may include 'wishful thinking', 
rewards, and penalties, where these distort our judgement. The significance of 
this distinction is apparent when we consider the gambler's fallacy where the 
desire to win may be a factor in favouring an option that is believed to be a 'good 
omen', although there is no doubt that cognitive heuristics play a significant and 
often decisive role in our estimations of measure and probability. 
 
Even when individuals are incentivised to expend extra cognitive effort, the 
influence of biases and cognitive heuristics persists largely unchanged. This 
raises the question whether it would be apt to regard "human decision makers as 
systematically flawed bumblers" (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2000, as cited in Gilovich, 
Griffin & Kahneman, 2002, p.8). However, this is a dubious critique that ignores 
the vital role our cognitive heuristics have played in human survival as a species, 
fine-tuned by evolution to promote our longevity and reproductive success. 
Although we may now find these cognitive mechanisms inconvenient on 
occasions, they are properly regarded as the efficient automation of cognitive 
tasks that would in other circumstances overwhelm us, and there is really no 
possibility at all that we could function without them. 
 
In fact, studies suggest that less information and less computation may in some 
circumstances lead to greater accuracy, which has been dubbed the 'less-is-
more' effect (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011, p.453). However, this is not a linear 
29 
 
effect where accuracy increases as information decreases, but rather represents 
"the existence of a point at which more information or computation becomes 
detrimental, independent of costs" (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009, pp.110-1). The 
problem remains that while in some scenarios that "point" falls within the 
operational ambit of our cognitive heuristics, very often it does not and so in that 
case we make poor decisions that could have been improved with more 
information and more conscious thought. 
 
Nonetheless with some effort we can be trained to approach problems more 
logically, for example employing greater 'statistical sophistication', and can 
thereby reduce our individual susceptibility to some biases to some degree 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 2002, p.231). Moreover, in the context of society and 
community we can and do build comprehensive systems and safeguards into our 
daily lives that save us from the worst consequences of our biases. For example, 
while some aspects of our individual decision making associated with buying a 
new car – e.g., choice of colour – may involve our cognitive heuristics, and 
specific features that we require the vehicle to have will usually be at the forefront 
of our consciousness, critical issues such as safety and fuel efficiency are 
addressed by relevant laws that recognise our inability to adequately assess 
those factors heuristically or otherwise. 
 
2.3. Informal fallacies 
 
In theory, 'biases and cognitive heuristics' could include any cognitive process 
that enables us to make rapid decisions when we perceive external stimuli. 
Arguably, it should not make a difference whether the cognitive process 
incorporates pre-existing notions of efficient computation, or inefficiently allows 
logic errors to lead us astray. Either way, our brain is processing external stimuli 
unconsciously unless we assert conscious control. However, there is some 
controversy about including informal fallacies in a study of biases and cognitive 





By way of definition, informal fallacies involve the misapplication of inductive 
logic. For example, if we accept an assertion as truth only because the assertion 
was made by a person in authority, we may have fallen victim to the fallacy 
argumentum ad verecundiam, which broadly translates to 'fallacious appeals to 
authority'. Similarly, if our strong desire for an outcome encourages an unrealistic 
belief that undertaking a specific task will achieve that outcome – a kind of 'wishful 
thinking' – we may be affected by the fallacy ad consequentiam (an argument 
based on consequences). An example of the fallacy ad consequentiam is when 
we throw a coin into a wishing well and make a wish for new car or a pay rise. 
 
Many fallacies also have a negative form. For example, the fallacy ad 
consequentiam can be expressed as the belief that an assertion is false because 
an outcome is not desirable. In the U.K. in 1974, six men were arrested for 
planting bombs in Birmingham that killed 21 people. Following their trial, the six 
were sentenced to life imprisonment, but then applied to have the convictions 
overturned. In his judgment in the Court of Appeal refusing that application, 
McIlkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1980] QB 283, Lord Denning 
said: (original judgment at p.22) 
 
"Just consider the course of events if this action were to proceed to trial... If 
the six men win, it will mean that the police were guilty of perjury, that they 
were guilty of violence and threats, that the confessions were involuntary 
and were improperly admitted in evidence: and that the convictions were 
erroneous... This is such an appalling vista that every sensible person in the 
land would say: It cannot be right that these actions should go any further." 
 
Although Lord Denning (d. 1999) is generally regarded as one of England's 
greatest judges, his comments in this McIlkenny judgment have been widely 
criticised as fallacious, and the decision was subsequently overturned by the 
House of Lords in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] 




Brief introduction to formal logic and fallacies 
 
Cognitive heuristics and biases do not involve formal logic. Formal logic can be 
expressed as a way of identifying how a set of known information can lead to a 
logical conclusion. For example, if group A contains all members of group B, and 
all members of group A have a specific characteristic, we can say that all 
members of group B have that same characteristic. We also call this 'deductive 
logic' or 'deductive augmentation'. 'Augmentation' refers to the manner in which 
the known information is parlayed into an argument. Deductive augmentation 
uses logic to make a truthful argument. Unfortunately, there are several problems 
with deductive logic as a universal approach to making decisions: 
 
• To make a deduction we need relevant facts which may not be available. 
 
• Although many deductive scenarios are similar to my group A and group 
B example above, most are far more complex making it hard to work out 
the logical answer. 
 
• Often we have extensive information to inform a deduction, but it may not 
be the deduction we need. This is frequently the case where we can see 
a correlation between two events but cannot deduce which event (if either) 
is causative. 
 
McFerran (2015, p.4) refers to Aristotle's "classic example" of a deduction based 
on formal logic: 
 
"All men are mortal and Socrates is a man, so Socrates is mortal (or A –> B 
and C –> A, so C –> B)." 
 
We don't usually have much difficulty with logic at this level. But how about this 




"All Republicans are conservatives, and Senator Short is a conservative, so 
he must be a Republican." 
 
You can see the illogic here. We call this example a 'fallacy', although it must be 
regarded as a 'formal fallacy' as distinct from an informal one because it is really 
a 'pattern mistake' – i.e., if we adopt a symbolic approach we can see that the 
error is in the pattern itself: it is incorrect to say that B –> A just because A –> C 
and B –> C (McFerran, 2015, p.4). This pattern can never be deductive. However, 
if we fix the pattern so it is logically correct, the outcome can then be deductive 
subject to the information provided. With this McFerran example as it stands, the 
most we can say is that it is possible that Senator Short is a Republican, but it 
also remains possible that he is not. We don't have enough information. Even if 
we knew in addition that most conservatives are Republicans, we still could not 
say for sure (deduce) that Senator Short is a Republican. 
 
Informal or 'inductive' logic 
 
If it seems very probable to us that conservatives are more likely to be 
Republicans than Democrats, we could perhaps make an 'inductive argument' 
that Senator Short is a Republican. In some cases, such an argument would be 
a strong one, but it depends on the content and the context. There are many 
circumstances where such arguments are not strong at all – e.g., they may rely 
on 'inductive augmentation' that is unreliable ('unacceptable augmentation') 
which in some cases could involve 'informal fallacies'. 
 
The strength of induction derives from the content of the information, and 
sometimes its context, so inductive error usually arises from misuse of the 
content. Walton (2010, p.175) identifies several fallacies – e.g., "equivocation, 
amphiboly, accent, begging the question, [and] fallacies of irrelevance, like red 
herring and wrong conclusion" – that could not be regarded as heuristic, but lists 




– ad misericordiam (argument based on distress) 
– ad populum (argument based on popular opinion) 
– ad hominem (e.g., circumstantial arguments) 
– ad baculum (argument based on threat or fear) 
– straw man (argument based on commitment) 
– slippery slope schemes 
– ad consequentiam (argument based on consequences) 
– ad ignorantiam (argument based on ignorance) 
– ad verecundiam (argument based on expert opinion) 
– post hoc (causal argument based on correlation) 
– composition and division (argument based on composition or division) 
– false analogy (argument based on analogy) 
 
Conventionally, a reasoning error based on flawed logic has been described as 
a fallacy and therefore distinguishable from errors arising from cognitive 
heuristics or biases (Ross, 2014, p.4). A simple logic error is not, in Ross's view, 
enough to qualify as a heuristic outcome. However, Johnson (2005, as cited in 
Cummings, 2014, p.5) identifies that heuristic processing as a 'parascheme' 
works alongside more systematic mental activities, taking over when we receive 
'cues' that can inform a snap judgment. Systematic mental activities typically 
involve formal logic to analyse content and reach a logical decision when that is 
possible. Walton (2010, p.x) uses the term paraschemes to represent the 
heuristical structure facilitating a "fast and frugal" approach to making decisions 
that our cognitive resources would struggle to address systematically in any 
practicable time-frame if at all (Gigerenzer et al., 1999, as cited in Walton, p.161). 
 
The mediating role of cognitive heuristics 
 
Walton (2010, as cited in Cummings, 2014, p.5) is credited by Cummings as the 
first writer to treat certain informal fallacies as cognitive heuristics. Walton (2010, 
p.160) describes heuristics as the "psychological dimension" of some fallacies, 
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and suggests that three specific heuristics – deference to expert opinion, 
accepting not false as truth, and avoiding fear – may be regarded as "a mediating 
concept between the notions of fallacy and defeasible argumentation scheme." 
The three examples given by Walton may be analysed in the following way: 
(pp.163-4) 
 
• deference to expert opinion: if a person recognised as an expert says that 
A is true, A must be true. This corresponds to the fallacy argumentum ad 
verecundiam, or 'fallacious appeals to authority'. 
 
• accepting not false as truth: if A is not false, it must be true. This 
corresponds to argumentum ad ignorantiam, or 'arguments from 
ignorance'. 
 
• avoiding fear: if consequence C induces fear, avoid activity that might lead 
to consequence C. This corresponds to ad baculum arguments, or 
'arguments that appeal to threats'. 
 
You can see immediately that these examples do not involve deductive 
reasoning, although they may be persuasive in some circumstances. Considering 
deference to expert opinion, if the opinion-giver has the requisite expertise and 
we have a basis for having confidence in his or her opinions within that field of 
expertise, then accepting the opinion as fact may be pragmatic. In fact, we do 
this every day. If our car mechanic says we need new spark plugs we usually 
accept this, just as we may accept legal advice from a qualified lawyer operating 
in the relevant area of law. There is of course no guarantee that either advice is 
correct, and sometimes we will want to obtain a second opinion, but otherwise 
we may rely on the expert because that makes sense to us. Even where we have 
very little information to rely on when evaluating our expert, our biases will assist 
us to arrive at a decision. In some cases, it will be a wrong decision, perhaps 





In practice, our cognitive heuristics operate at a level of complexity that belies 
their apparent simplicity. Although fallacious appeals to authority may in some 
cases deserve condemnation, behind the scenes our heuristics are considering 
a sophisticated set of questions: (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, p.310, as cited 
in Walton, 2010, p.165) 
 
• expertise: is our opinion-giver a known 'expert source'? 
 
• field: is our opinion-giver a subject matter expert? 
 
• opinion: how does the opinion relate to the proposition? 
 
• trustworthiness: is the opinion-giver known to be a reliable source of 
opinions? 
 
• consistency: is the opinion consistent with other expert assertions? 
 
• evidence: is the opinion supported by evidence? 
 
Thinking about our car mechanic, we might consider all these factors: 
 
• expertise: is our mechanic a known 'expert source' in relation to car 
engines? 
 
• field: is our mechanic an expert in relation to spark plugs? 
 
• opinion: what does our mechanic say about the spark plugs and what do 
we infer from that? 
 




• consistency: is the mechanic's opinion consistent with other expert 
assertions? (here we might refer for example to data about the usual life 
of spark plugs, if that data is known to us) 
 
• evidence: is the opinion supported by evidence? (perhaps the mechanic 
has shown us one of the old spark plugs and pointed out the contact 
erosion that supports his or her opinion) 
 
Recently, in 2017, I had an experience very much like this, where the mechanic 
looking at my car suggested that a drive belt needed replacing. I don't recall a 
conscious process of going through all the above steps, but when I check through 
them in my mind now I realise that all these factors were present including that 
last one: he showed me the worn belt. What I do recall is that when he asked if I 
wanted the belt replaced, without a moment's hesitation I replied "yes." 
 
The confidence-giving role of cognitive heuristics 
 
Although we may get to know some tradespeople and professionals quite well, in 
many situations we will have very limited information about an authority-figure 
whose advice we are needing to rely on. For example, if we see a doctor about 
stomach pain we may have no idea about the doctor's skills in that particular area 
or whether he or she is trustworthy or consistent. Perhaps we have never seen 
the particular doctor before. Nonetheless, when the doctor pronounces a 
diagnosis we seldom question it. To some extent we are relying on broader 
confidence in doctors as a profession, but we also know that doctors sometimes 
make horrendous mistakes. Relying on a doctor in these circumstances is 
fallacious, a clear case of argumentum ad verecundia, but we do it nonetheless. 
Put simply, our cognitive heuristics give us confidence – whether it is justified or 
not – that the diagnosis is correct, and we wander off to the pharmacy with our 




In a similar way, we are often heavily influenced by popular opinion. Ad populum 
arguments are implicitly imprudent, even though the bias we have towards 
popular opinion is most often harmless and may even lead us to a sensible 
approach depending on our interests and objectives. 
 
In relation to arguments based on ignorance, argumentum ad ignorantiam, 
Walton (2010, pp.175-6) gives the example of Roman soldiers receiving medals: 
 
"… there is no evidence that Roman soldiers received posthumous medals 
in war, only evidence of living soldiers receiving such awards. From this lack 
of evidence, the conclusion can be drawn by inference that Roman soldiers 
did not receive posthumous decorations in war... It is commonly called the 
'lack of evidence argument' in the social sciences or the ex silentio argument 
in history, where it is regarded as a reasonable but defeasible argument." 
 
A very practical example of this 'lack of evidence argument' can be found in the 
U.K. Government's reassurance to the general public about eating beef following 
the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, which relied entirely on the 
lack of evidence that beef was not safe for consumption (Cummings, 2014, p.7). 
BSE is popularly known as "mad cow disease" and can be transmitted to humans 
in some circumstances. 
 
In our minds, a bias may be regarded as a preconscious argument that appears 
to be a better argument than it really is (Hansen, 2002, p.152, as cited in Walton, 
2010, p.180). While drawing a clear demarcation between fallacy and bias might 
be an impossible task, certainly one outside the scope of this study, there seems 
little doubt that some fallacies are simply "a very natural way of unreflective 




Chapter 3 – Focus on Confirmation Bias 
 
One day my car had a flat tyre. Attempts to fit the spare wheel were unsuccessful, 
so I walked down the street to a vehicle repair shop that I had not visited 
previously. A young lad in the office said I would have to pay a "$60 call-out fee" 
even though my vehicle was clearly visible less than 100 metres up the road from 
the repair shop. Fuming about this outrageous fee (that I refused to pay) as I 
walked back to the car alone, I removed the old wheel and rolled it back to the 
repair shop to be fixed. I subsequently told my friends about the "idiot" at the 
repair shop. This soon became the "idiots" at the repair shop, and then a vow that 
I would never ever take my car there again. All perfectly logical of course.  
 
However, there's another side to this story that I reluctantly share. About a year 
later I urgently needed a vehicle fitness check (called a pink slip in some states). 
I'd left it too late, and most workshops were closed or booked up. Grinding my 
teeth a bit I resigned myself to the misfortune of breaking my vow, and drove into 
the original repair shop. When they looked up my car on their computer and 
confirmed my status as a "valued existing customer" I was welcomed like a long-
lost friend. Moreover, I was reminded that the first time I went to them I'd actually 
purchased three tyres from them. I had no recollection of this aspect of that 
transaction, although clearly the tyres had performed as well as they should have. 
I only recalled my irritation at how I was quoted $60 for a call-out to a vehicle that 
was just a block away. This last visit they were nothing short of professional and 
helpful in giving the vehicle its fitness check. 
 
However, I still couldn't quite get rid of the notion that they were "idiots"... It was 
a bit irrational, but my initial belief about this repair shop hung around in my head, 







3.1. Forming a belief 
 
Nickerson (1998) records that the English philosopher Francis Bacon identified 
as far back as the year 1620 that we tend to celebrate successes and forget 
failures, which is a typical characteristic of the confirmation bias phenomenon. A 
more refined definition of confirmation bias is provided by Nickerson himself, who 
took the term to "represent a generic concept that subsumes several more 
specific ideas that connote the inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or beliefs 
whose truth is in question" (p.175). Noting the lack of intentionality that typically 
distinguishes unconscious 'case-building' from the more deliberate biases of 
attorneys and debaters, Nickerson suggests that a fundamental aspect of 
confirmation bias is: (pp.175-6) 
 
"unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence... without 
intending to treat evidence in a biased way or even being aware of doing 
so." 
 
The starting point is the holding of a belief. In some situations, such as that facing 
a juror in a criminal trial, the belief we are concerned about is the one that is 
formed before all relevant information is to hand – i.e., failing to wait until all the 
evidence has been heard, the lawyers' summing up has been completed, the 
judge has given directions, and the jury is about to retire to reach a verdict. In 
relation to 'belief', McKay and Bennett (2009, p.493) propose that: 
 
"A belief is a functional state of an organism that implements or embodies 
that organism’s endorsement of a particular state of affairs as actual." 
 
However, actuality may never be known in some cases, and it is hard to see why 
a belief must have any link to actuality at all. Belief is, I suggest, simply a matter 
of having an opinion about a situation or state of affairs, which may be a strongly-
held opinion or perhaps may be quite tenuous. Moreover, a belief can be formed 
in the context of knowing that it may possibly be erroneous. 
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3.2. Persistence of belief 
 
I am writing the first draft of this paragraph on the day after the inauguration of 
Donald Trump as America's 45th president, a man who has been accused of 
many untruths (e.g., Stanley, 2016; Kessler & Kelly, 2018). However, as Stanley 
asserts, it is quite likely that Mr Trump reaches and proclaims beliefs in a way 
that is knowingly "insensitive to reality" and demonstrates a kind of laziness about 
the truth that is both convenient and cynical. Convenient because it enables him 
to define a reality that aligns with the ambitions of his supporters. Cynical because 
it takes improper advantage of electors' susceptibility to "authoritarian rhetoric." 
What Mr Trump's approach to truth speaks to is the malleability and attributional 
quality of belief. A reasonable inference we can take from Mr Trump's statements 
is that he persistently believes he is hugely successful. 
 
If we consider the situation of the juror who has heard the first few days of a long 
trial and has already formed a belief about the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
we might be tempted to regard that simplistically – e.g., "the accused is probably 
guilty of the crime" – but a nuanced belief is more likely, such as "having heard 
the evidence so far, it seems probable that he committed the crime, but having 
seen the accused in the dock I think the crime would be out of character." This 
construction (or deconstruction) opens the door to an infinity of possibilities, in 
terms of how confirmation bias may affect the juror's acquisition and interpretation 
of information from that point onwards in the trial. 
 
This can be contrasted with 'commitment bias' a.k.a. 'escalation of commitment 
bias', where the holder of a belief is strongly committed to it even where 
maintaining the belief leads to conduct that is irrational, at least in social contexts 
(Painter, 2004, pp.405-6; Back, 2010, p.27). Escalation of commitment bias has 
been defined as "persistence... with a failing course of action" (Brockner, 1992, 





3.3. Operationalisation of confirmation bias 
 
Manifestations of confirmation bias can give the impression that entirely different 
factors are in play, but a critical factor is that the process where it arises is always 
a form of 'decision making', whether it leads to a better (or worse) test outcome, 
or a life-changing decision to follow a particular course of action (Panda, 2014; 
Rassin, 2008, p.88). Rassin notes that confirmation bias both affects our 
perceptions of stimuli, and how we evaluate perceived stimuli in the context of a 
specific theory or belief. However, the use of 'confirmatory decision strategies' is 
strongly dependent on the circumstances of the decision making, even though 
some individuals may be more prone to using them than others (p.92). 
 
There is also an 'accumulation effect', where information received and evaluated 
over time eventually reaches a point when "a critical event occurs that halts the 
decision process" – e.g., due to tiredness, the acquisition of significant new 
information, or a deluge of information that exceeds the individual's cognitive 
capacity to process it (Devine, 2012, p.25). As discussed in the next section, I 
don't agree wholly with Devine's theorisation on this specific point, although 
there's no doubt that the accumulation of information and the formation of biases 
can be related. 
 
Later in his book, Devine (2012) discusses joinder of charges in criminal 
proceedings – i.e., cases where a person has multiple charges heard by a jury 
(or judge alone) at the same time – and the phenomenon first demonstrated by 
Kerr and Sawyers (1979, as cited in Devine) and Horowitz, Bordens, and 
Feldman (1980, as cited in Devine) where the conviction rate for a 'focal charge' 
increases significantly if a jury is asked to consider a second charge at the same 
time. However, having more than one alleged offender tried at the same time (in 
the same trial) has not been found to significantly affect the outcome compared 





3.4. Proneness to confirmation bias 
 
Although Devine (2012, p.25) suggests that confirmation bias arising from an 
'accumulation point' -- i.e., where information favouring a particular belief has 
become persuasive -- effectively "halts the decision process", this is not 
supported by Devine's own work or by other studies identified so far. In a lengthy 
trial, it is virtually inconceivable that a typical juror reaches a point of complete 
resistance to (for example) highly compelling contrary evidence, due to the 
decision-making process having halted for that juror. That situation could only 
arise in circumstances of 'escalation of commitment bias' or some other 
entrenched bias or other factor that is not susceptible to rational thinking. 
However, any such factor would almost certainly involve the juror having a mental 
investment in the trial outcome, representing a perverse partiality that is outside 
the scope of confirmation bias. It is more likely, and consistent with other studies, 
that the accumulation point identified by Devine is the threshold when a mental 
model is formed, and that the subject is then susceptible to confirmation bias 
favouring that model. Under the heading 'accumulation prejudice', Goodman-
Delahunty, Cossins and Martschuk (2016, pp.46-7) comment as follows 
regarding joinder of charges in criminal proceedings: 
 
"As Leipold and Abbasi submitted, intuitively at least, the more counts the 
defendant is charged with, the more likely it is that a jury will conclude that 
the defendant is guilty of something. The hypothesis is that juries are prone 
to conclude that because there are multiple charges or multiple witnesses 
supporting the prosecution’s case, the defendant is guilty." 
 
I think the words "prone to conclude" represent a good understanding of the point 
that Devine is apparently trying to make, which is that with cognitive bias in play 
– e.g., when significant information is received by jurors at an early stage of the 
case, such as the number and type of charges faced by the defendant – the die 
is loaded against the defendant, increasing the likelihood that some of the jurors 
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will reach a belief about the defendant's guilt well before all of the evidence in the 
case has been heard. 
 
3.5. Persistency over time 
 
My objective in this chapter has been to convey some of the complexity 
associated with confirmation bias, even though it is often presented as 
conceptually simple. It is of particular relevance to my thesis that once a theory 
or belief has formed in an individual's mind, it can be highly persistent over time. 
This means, for example, that child protection caseworkers responsible for 
evaluating the risk to a child may be biased in their assessment of specific risk 
factors due to their previous experiences and beliefs they have formed about child 
safety over a long period. Similarly, children who experience abuse are very likely 
to form persistent beliefs about the impact of that abuse and what kinds of 
responses to it are appropriate. These beliefs will then unconsciously inform the 
acquisition and use of information over the individual's lifetime, perhaps leading 
to a tragic misunderstanding of the patterns of that lifetime and of the origins of 
adversity in it. However, this outcome and the confirmation bias phenomenon 
need to be considered against the much broader tableaux against which our 
human existence plays out. While personal tragedy is life at its worst for the 
affected individual and those close to him or her, such tragedy can only be 
evaluated by an empirical measure of life in all its fullness including its best 
moments. If we focus only on the negative we may fail to see that our cognitive 
processes, imperfect as they are, have taken us to heights that no other species 
known to us has every achieved. 
 
3.6. Types of confirmation bias 
 
Much has already been written and published about the different forms of 
confirmation bias, and it is not necessary for me to cover them here in great detail. 
A modest summary is sufficient for present purposes, using Nickerson's (1998) 




– Seeking and interpreting information according to our theories or  
   beliefs 
– Flawed reasoning 
– Primacy effect and how a belief persists 
– Evaluation of our own judgment 
 
To that categorisation I have added two further categories for biases that appear 
to meet the definition of confirmation bias, but which are not easily allocated to 
one of Nickerson's category areas: 
 
– Low signal-to-noise ratio and change blindness 
– Delusional thinking 
 
In establishing the last category, I acknowledge that not all delusional thinking 
involves confirmation bias, and that the boundary between confirmation bias and 
sustained delusional thinking is uncertain. 
 
Seeking and interpreting information according to our beliefs 
 
Nickerson (1998) notes that confirmation bias often involves actively seeking 
evidence that supports a particular belief or giving undue weight to an 
interpretation that is consistent with the belief. For example, if a person believes 
in the existence of a deity, he or she is likely to seek out evidence supporting the 
belief, and may interpret ambiguous or contrary evidence in a way that also 
supports the belief. Everyday life abounds with opportunities to attribute good 
fortune to a kind and benevolent deity, while regarding misfortune as punishment 
for failing to live up to the same deity's expectations. The notion that all or most 
such events are better attributed to chance is hard for most people to grasp, as 
our daily lives are built on the premise that most events are able to be (and 




When we observe an event that is consistent only with our belief, not with any 
competing or inconsistent belief, that observation is said to be "diagnostic" – i.e., 
it diagnoses the truth of our belief. Accordingly, an observation that supports an 
alternative belief is not diagnostic. This is a critical factor in assessing belief, 
because our unwavering adherence to a particular belief means that we are not 
open to any possibility that there is another, inconsistent belief that is more likely 
to be true. We therefore fail to test that other belief, and in fact tend to ignore that 
possibility entirely. We are rather adept at this. Kuhn (1989, p.677) conducted a 
study where subjects were provided with information that contradicted their belief 
about a matter. According to Kuhn: 
 
"Subjects either failed to acknowledge discrepant evidence or attended to it 
in a selective, distorting manner. Identical evidence was interpreted one way 
in relation to a favored theory and another way in relation to a 
theory that was not favored…" 
 
Significant, the subjects remembered the information as more in line with their 
belief than it was, distorting the information or simply not recalling it correctly so 
as to facilitate the maintenance of their belief. 
 
We also tend to see an 'illusory correlation' between unrelated objects or events, 
such as where we see specific objects or events in the same context, or where 
we perceive that a correlation "ought to exist" (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p.97, as 
cited in Nickerson, 1998, p.183). The illusory correlation may then inform our 
understanding of particular relationships, so that our learned behaviour is 
changed to reflect that new understanding (Goldberg, 1968, 493, as cited in 
Nickerson, p.183). This is closely related to stereotyping, where our belief about 
a relationship between particular factors – e.g., poverty and crime – leads to our 
being "more likely to seek and find evidence to support the belief than evidence 
to oppose it, somewhat independently of the facts" (Nickerson, p.183). This 
'illusion of consistency' reflects our being more attentive – Nickerson uses the 
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Nickerson (1998) describes the classic experiment conducted by Wason (1966; 
1968, pp.274-5) involving two-sided cards. It is a simple but – in its outcome – 
disarming experiment that uses just four cards to establish our almost universal 
failure to attend to a selection task. Nickerson describes the experiment as 
follows: 
 
"[P]articipants see an array of cards and are told that each card has a letter 
on one side and a number on the other. Each of the cards they see shows 
either a vowel, a consonant, an even number, or an odd number, and 
participants are asked to indicate which cards one would have to turn over 
in order to determine the truth or falsity of the following statement: If a card 
has a vowel on one side then it has an even number on the other side." 
 
Consider this example: The visible cards are  [E]  [X]  [6]  [9]. Studies consistently 
show that most people will select only card [E], or else cards [E] and [6]. They 
ignore cards with a consonant or an odd number because those are apparently 
not related to the problem at hand. Most people struggle to see that proving that 
[E] is backed by an even number does not prove the statement, as one of the 
other cards may refute it. Those who select [E] and [6] remain ignorant of whether 
the statement is disproved by card [9], as it would be if the back of card [9] was 
a vowel. The two cards that can prove the statement are [E] and [9] together, 
because it does not matter what is behind [X] or [6]. 
 
This 'card trick' is often seen by subjects as more interesting than significant, but 
it goes to the heart of our reasoning process when presented with a situation that 
requires us to decide whether a statement or assertion is true or false. We tend 
to focus on the factors that are most apparently relevant to our belief about the 
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situation, and accordingly fail to attend to factors or options that may give us a 
more accurate outcome or understanding. 
 
Although the broad range of findings in studies using variants of Wason's card 
experiment are not all explained by confirmation bias, the experiment 
demonstrates the existence of the phenomenon and its "substantive role" in many 
cases (Nickerson, p.187). 
 
Primacy effect and how a belief persists 
 
The 'primacy effect' refers to how the first observations or information received 
by an individual about an issue tend to inform the interpretation of subsequent 
information on the issue. For example, Bruner and Potter (1964, as cited in 
Nickerson, 1998) found that when they showed subjects a series of images, the 
first of which was unfocused and unrecognisable, that first image nonetheless 
promoted a belief that persisted even as the images progressively revealed a 
particular object – i.e., those shown the initial image struggled to recognise the 
object when it became clearer, while those who were not shown the initial image 
were able to identify the object easily from the later images. 
 
In another study, observers watching a group of problem solvers work through a 
variety of problems rated the problem solvers more highly if they solved more 
earlier problems and less later problems, than those who did the reverse. The 
initial impression persisted despite the problem solvers' actual overall results 
(Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals & Ward, 1968, p.336). In a study by Ross et al. 
(1975, p.882) the subjects were asked to assess the genuineness of suicide 
notes. Some were then told that their assessments were better than the average, 
others were led to believe the opposite, and a third group were told that they were 
average performers. Subsequently all of the subjects were told that their 
outcomes were "determined before they entered the experiment, that they had 
received feedback unrelated to their actual performance" (Ross et al., p.882). 
Nonetheless, when asked to state their competence at making such 
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assessments, the subjects who had been told they performed above average 
rated themselves more highly than those who received the negative feedback. 
 
The persistence of a belief can become more entrenched as subjects – or 
individuals acting similarly in real life situations – look for and find further 
information that tends to confirm the belief, so that the belief is not merely based 
on "the fraudulent feedback" received at the outset but is also supported by the 
subsequently acquired information (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, as cited in Nickerson, 
1998, p.188). This suggests that even in research situations, where it is intended 
to debrief subjects who have been given false information in the course of a study, 
there is a real risk that belief in the false information will persist beyond the scope 
of the study and the debriefing. 
 
The persistence of belief is also assisted by what Rossmo (2016, p.218) 
describes as 'groupthink', which involves individual constraint in challenging the 
prevailing theories or beliefs within the group. Citing Janis (1982), Rossmo 
suggests that individuals in the group may become close-minded to the possibility 
of different theories or beliefs being true, and give undeserved weight to the 
apparent consistency of opinion within the group. 
 
Evaluation of our own judgement 
 
Earlier I discussed the study by Ross et al. (1975), where the subjects were asked 
to assess the genuineness of suicide notes. In that study, predetermined 
feedback was given to the subjects. However, in real life we are often placed in 
the position of having to evaluate our own competence at performing a task, 
which can be referred to as a 'confidence judgment'. Many studies have found 
that we are more likely to over-rate our competence than to under-rate it (e.g., 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Fischhoff, 1982; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; all as 
cited in Nickerson, 1998) – the 'above-average effect' (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 
p.1122) – and demonstrate reluctance to recant an unrealistic rating even when 




This 'above-average effect' even affects subject matter specialists – for example 
doctors and psychology students who in different studies were found to exhibit 
overconfidence in their ability to achieve specific outcomes – particularly where 
a prediction or diagnosis is not founded on statistical data (Keren, 1987, p.100, 
citing Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981, Lusted, 1977, and Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff, 1977). It is therefore ironic that such professionals may tend to 
have more confidence in their personal assessment than an assessment derived 
from statistical data, even when the statistical data challenges the personal 
assessment. Nickerson (1998, p.189) theorises that an individual's 
overconfidence in his or her own knowledge is sustained by the way in which 
memory retrieval follows the line of a "tentative answer" to produce consistent 
information, while other available information that may be inconsistent is not 
found. 
 
While an individual's tendency to regard him or herself as above average is 
undoubtedly a cognitive issue, it is not necessarily connected to confirmation 
bias. However, failure to recognise the relationship between one's own 
shortcomings and a pattern of errors may be indicative of 'self-erasing errors' 
(Redelmeier & Scales, 2015, p.280). Redelmeier and Scales (citing Sherman, 
1980) define this kind of confirmation bias as arising "when people do not know 
enough to realize they do not know enough." 
 
Low signal-to-noise ratio and change blindness 
 
Although the term 'signal-to-noise ratio' is widely used to denote potential for 
confusion between desired information and background 'noise', the concept can 
also be applied to our human perceptive processes. This may, for example, be 
related to persistence of belief, where later information is not heard so well as to 
force a re-evaluation of an earlier-formed belief, so the problem is one of attention 
rather than availability. However, the 'noise' category also stands on its own 
because persistence of belief may in some cases defy the logical evaluation of 
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information received later, while persistence of belief arising from confusion 
between different sources of information or even misunderstood information from 
the same source is not necessarily illogical. Rossmo (2016, p.224) proposes that 
deficient attention to the bigger picture often arises from the combination of 
confirmation bias and low signal-to-noise ratio. 
 
It is easy to think of illustrations of how signal-to-noise ratio might conspire with 
confirmation bias to cause a wrong outcome in the end. For example, police 
investigations often involve evaluating hundreds or even thousands of leads, 
some of which will be dead-ends that should be weeded-out before they consume 
too much time. However, just one error – e.g., a potential suspect being 
overlooked – could be disastrous. In this illustration, the sheer volume of leads 
anticipated as dead-ends inherently introduces 'noise' that may obscure a 
potential suspect within the leads. 
 
Noise can also come from external factors, such as public pressure. For example, 
where a serial killer is on the loose, public pressure may demand that the killer 
be brought to justice. The consequent pressure that policing management bring 
to bear on investigating officers amounts to a form of noise that impacts the 
methodical evaluation of evidence and encourages officers to form conclusions 
that may be wide of the mark. 
 
In our private lives too, noise encourages confirmation bias. For example, a 
purchase decision may be influenced by advertising; if we constantly hear on 
television and radio that the ABC brand gismo that our kids want for Christmas is 
the most popular toy ever, then on Christmas eve as we do our last-minute 
shopping this noise crowds out the notion that another toy or brand may be just 
as good at half the price. 
 
Low signal-to-noise ratio can also involve 'noise' that is linguistic or malformed, 
such as where the information given to a person is couched in terms that obscure 
its true meaning. An example might be where a risk warning is entirely true, but 
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the words used to express it mislead the individual hearing the warning. 
Gigerenzer (2001, pp.93-94) tells the story of a psychiatrist who warned patients 
prescribed the anti-depressant Prozac that they had a 30-50% risk of developing 
a sexual problem while on the drug. The information was correct, but was 
nonetheless misunderstood by most patients who perceived that they would have 
sexual problems such as sexual dysfunction or low libido more than a third of the 
time. Reference instead to "three out of ten patients" developing a sexual problem 




Building on their definitions of belief and misbelief, McKay and Dennett (2009) 
explore the proposition that humans are engineered by evolution to formulate 
beliefs approximating current beliefs informed by available evidence, and why 
this proposition is subject to "routine exceptions" (p.494). McKay and Dennett 
distinguish between two types of misbelief, being malfunctioning of the systems 
that formulate beliefs, and misbelief that arises from normal functioning. The first 
of these types may also be referred to as arising from 'doxastic dysfunction' – i.e., 
as being "the faulty output of a disordered, defective, abnormal cognitive system" 
(p.496). They suggest that delusions fall into this type 
 
Mishara and Corlett (2009) suggest that delusions can be attributed to: 
 
"... aberrations of perception which occur when neuronal noise induces 
mismatches between expectancy (Bayesian priors) and experience 
(sensory inputs/evidence), but in terms of the single factor, prediction error." 
 
In simple terms, this suggests that delusional thinking can routinely arise when 
'neuronal noise' – i.e., random neuronal misfiring, a biological activity that is 
always present to some degree – exceeds a certain threshold such that the 
individual becomes inclined to jump to conclusions more quickly. This could be 
because evaluating available inputs in those circumstances is confounded by the 
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apparently greater "value of choices inferred from probabilistic reasoning" (Jardri 
& Denève, 2013, p.296). This mechanism may also be an explanation for 
disorders such as schizophrenia, as studies suggest that patients typically exhibit 
greater levels of delusional paranoia when neuronal “noise” is present at higher 
levels (Moutoussis et al., 2011, p.425). 
 
3.7. Confirmation bias in daily life 
 
In the previous discussion of types of confirmation bias, I have given a few real-
life illustrations. However, it is easy to dismiss such illustrations as pertaining to 
other people, not oneself. In this section I set out a few examples of erroneous 
beliefs that were widely held, and some that still are. Fortunately, the long-
enduring notion that the Earth is flat appears to have largely succumbed in the 
face of photographic evidence to the contrary, but superstition and errant 
rationalisation remain hard at work. 
 
Coincidence informing popular belief 
 
Nickerson (1998) gives the wonderful example of the mathematical relationships 
that Taylor (1859) and Smyth (1864, 1890) found when reviewing measurements 
of the Great Pyramid of Egypt: 
 
• The ratio of the pyramid's base to the width of a casing stone was 365:1. 
 
• Multiplying the pyramid's height by 109 produced a figure roughly 
equivalent to the moon's distance from the earth. 
 
• Many other measurements of the pyramid could be related to natural 
distances. 
 
Von Daniken (1969, as cited in Nickerson) pronounced these mathematical 
relationships as evidence that the earth was previously visited by aliens; his 
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books – reflecting "cosmic explanations for biblical stories" earlier attributed to 
Immanuel Velikovsky (Boudry, Blancke & Pigliucci, 2014, p.7) – were widely 
popular, and in one study were found to influence graduate students just as much 
as they influenced first-year students (Bainbridge, 1978, as cited in Feder, 1984, 
p.526). 
 
Even now, these Velikovskian ideas about extra-terrestrial interference in human 
culture inform a light-hearted belief, sustained by spin-off fantasies such as the 
imaginary world depicted in the popular sci-fi movie and television series 
Stargate, that perhaps aliens really did design the pyramids, even though we now 
know that the mathematical relationships that started it all are merely 
coincidences (Gardner, 1957, as cited in Nickerson), or at best – in relation to 
some measures – attributable to the known Egyptian ability to "derive the general 
case from a specific numerical example" (Shutler, 2009, p.350). 
 
Sources of harm and adversity 
 
Another historic example of confirmation bias described by Nickerson (1998) is 
in relation to witchcraft, which apparently flourished in 17th century England to 
the extent that more than 40,000 "witches" were put to death by burning or 
hanging in that century alone. By the start of that century, the notion that a man 
or woman was presumed innocent until proven guilty was well-entrenched in 
English law, and yet the reverse was true when it came to witchcraft. This arose 
from the highly persistent belief that pervaded England and Europe at the time, 
that many adverse events were the work of witches and that extraordinary 
measures were required to protect the populace from this scourge. There is no 
doubt that many adverse events did occur, and that many so-called witches 
confessed their profession when tortured sufficiently, and so the popular belief 
was confirmed perpetually over several centuries despite an almost complete 
lack of any evidence of wrong-doing by the majority of these unfortunate souls 




Lest we think that modern-day men and women are more discerning about the 
sources of adversity, consider the persistent of beliefs in the western world about 
the culpability of Muslim people in relation to terrorist acts. Vogel and Kebbell 
(2011, p.615) observe that confirmation bias operates in "forensic settings" such 
as in the evaluation of witnesses and the interrogation of suspects. Police and 
military officers investigating crimes are undoubtedly prone to confirmation bias 
when a suspect fits their existing beliefs, and the case of Dr Mohamed Hanreef 
discussed by Vogel and Kebbell is an interesting example of this. In short, Dr 
Hanreef – later found to be innocent of the allegations made against him – was 
arrested leaving Australia when erroneous information connected him to a 
bombing in London. Investigating officers reviewing ambiguous information about 
Dr Hanreef's movements and items in his possession, leapt to a conclusion that 
was primed by their belief that Dr Hanreef was guilty of assisting those 
responsible for the terror attack. The possibility of another explanation was not 
considered in the rush to charge Dr Hanreef and deprive him of his Australian 
citizenship.  
 
Injustice in justice 
 
Did O.J. Simpson murder Nicole Brown-Simpson and Ronald Goldman? After a 
trial lasting more than 8 months, Simpson was found 'not guilty' by a jury of his 
peers. That of itself is unremarkable, as criminal charges must be proved 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' and that level of certainty is often elusive when (as in 
Simpson's case) there was no eye-witness to the murders and the evidence was 
largely circumstantial. What was remarkable was the partisan reaction to the 
outcome. Echoing other polls around the United States, a Los Angeles telephone 
poll after the verdict was delivered found that "blacks were more than four times 
more likely than whites to think Simpson was not guilty" (Decker, 1995). Nearly 
50% of whites polled were "angry" at the acquittals, compared to about 4% of 
blacks. Although this was clearly a racial division, that does not fully explain the 
extraordinary divide in circumstances where every aspect of the trial was widely 
publicised and communities on both sides of the racial divide furiously debated 
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the significance of each new piece of evidence or revelation from the witness 
stand. In the end, the absence of certainty allowed bias to persist unimpeded, 
and what we saw was bias self-sustained in each group with limited regard for 
the jury's determination. 
 
In relation to court proceedings generally, Nickerson (1998) notes that the fact-
finding phase is typically decoupled from the decision-making phase to avoid the 
formation of opinions before all of the evidence is in. However, Nickerson 
suggests that the capacity of jurors to follow the court's admonition to keep "an 
open mind" is doubtful, and some individual jurors – and even some judges – 
may "develop their personal mental models of 'what really happened' as a case 
develops and continuously refine and elaborate those models as evidence 
continues to be presented" (p.193, citing Holstein, 1985). Such a model can 
"strongly influence" the interpretation of new information, and an early view as to 
the accused's guilt may affect the attention given to subsequent evidence and 
inform a biased interpretation of ambiguous evidence (Nickerson, p.193; Hendry 
& Shaffer, 1989, p.545). Kalven and Zeisel (1966, as cited in Nickerson, p.194) 
found that the "final verdicts that juries return are usually the same as the tentative 
ones they initially form." 
 
I'm dying over here, Doctor 
 
A well-known New Zealand case (well-known to anaesthetists anyway) is that of 
Dr Margaret Hugel, who was charged with manslaughter after her patient, a 
thirteen year old boy, suffered serious brain damage when an air filter became 
blocked. While the case partially turned on evidence about the relevant medical 
protocol, a critical factor in the boy's death was the occurrence of a "patient-
related problem... manifest as difficulty in breathing" well before the filter was or 
could have been blocked (Merry and McCall Smith, 2001, p.62). Faced with this 
presentation, Dr Hugel believed the problem was patient-related and persisted 
with ventilation efforts that ignored the possibility of equipment failure, even 
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though a blocked filter was the "smoking gun" that ultimately caused the tragic 
outcome (Merry and McCall Smith, p.21). 
 
Mattox (2012, pp.55-6) notes that the risk of medical error arising from 
confirmation bias is not limited to medical professionals acting alone, and gives 
the example of a team engaged in treating a patient where the members 
individually and collectively failed to diagnose the patient's condition. 
 
In another case, an anaesthetist was unable to insert a 'laryngeal mask airway' 
in order to ventilate the patient's lungs. None of the doctors (two anaesthetists 
and a surgeon) initiated the emergency tracheostomy procedure that could have 
avoided the patient's significant brain damage and subsequent death. A report 
on the case by Harmer (2005, as cited in White, 2012, p.45) identified that the 
doctors "lost track of time" as they attempted to insert the tracheal tube. 
 
Mattox (2012, p.56) suggests that knowledge-based cognitive tasks require 
"extensive mental energy", while Merry and McCall (2001, p.58, citing Reason, 
1990) refer to them as "effortful." This makes them especially at risk from 
confirmation bias (Mattox, p.56), compared to "the automatic, effortless, rapidly 
responsive processing by which an action is performed or a decision made 
virtually instantaneously" (Merry & McCall, p.58). 
 
In their empirical study of emergency department (ED) presentations by patients 
who had engaged in self-harm, Milner, Kolves and Kolves et al. (2013) found that 
pre-held beliefs about suicide risk and propensities towards self-harm played a 
significant role in how these patients were treated. For example, female patients 
with suicide ideation and communication (SIC) received less priority for treatment 
than male patients who presented after non-fatal suicide attempts. Milner et al. 
suggest that "female instances of suicidal behaviours in EDs could be seen as 
'attention seeking', 'manipulative behaviour' or a 'cry for help', and as such less 
worthy of treatment than presentations made by males" even though the mental 
pain experienced by these SIC patients may be more distressing that the physical 
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pain following a non-fatal suicide attempt (p.37). From this study and others cited 
by Milner et al., it seems highly likely that doctors and nurses in a hospital ED will 
often have performed beliefs about patients' deservedness to receive treatment 
based on patient gender and the type of presentation, and that these beliefs can 
persist regardless of a patient's specific presentation. 
 
3.8. Putting a positive spin on confirmation bias 
 
Merry and McCall Smith (2001, p.54) note that humans are highly prone to being 
distracted from the task at hand, and that some tasks do not "play to [our] 
strengths." However, we have an extraordinary ability to respond to unforeseen 
circumstances, and to recognise patterns based on our past experiences. 
Boudry, Blancke and Pigliucci (2014), despite their furious attack on the "fakery" 
of pseudoscience, nonetheless accept that our human intuitions and modern-day 
science may "be modeled as two inversely correlated and compensatory sources 
of cultural stabilization" (pp.2 & 17). Similarly, alluding to the multiplicity of 
influences to which we are subjected as organic beings, Leonyev (Leonyev & 
Cole, 2009, p.40) submits that: 
 
"maintenance of life... is itself also a directed, 'biassed' [sic], process, i.e. 
one that is inseparably linked with the living body's very existence and that 
constitutes its most essential and most necessary condition." 
 
It is implicit in Leonyev's argument that our survival as a species is beholden to 
evolutionary forces that have shaped us to instinctively choose paths involving 
the least risk. For example, while we may deride the attribution of agency to 
external entities that are in reality inert or unthinking, 'error management theory' 
would posit that it is far safer to treat all entities as lethal agents than to 
erroneously fail to identify a lethal agent due to taking a more critical, scientific 
stance (Barrett, 2000, as cited in Boudry et al, p.9). Similarly, referring to our 
pattern matching capabilities, "error management predicts that it is less costly to 
mistake a spurious correlation for a real causal phenomenon than to mistake a 
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real pattern for a random fluke", even if this makes us somewhat more vulnerable 
to superstitious beliefs founded in coincidence (Boudry et al., p.9). 
 
Therefore, while it is clear that in some circumstances our confirmation biases 
are inconvenient and may even yield outcomes that are harmful to us or others 
around us – a characteristic they share with most other biases and cognitive 
heuristics – the confirmatory phenomenon remains a critical contributor to our 
collective survival. 
 
Probability is not certainty 
 
In practice, statistics are seldom helpful to us in relation to day-to-day decision-
making. Consider the question of which bank to go with when arranging a 
mortgage for your purchase of a new home. Multiple probabilities are involved 
here, some of which may be measured and evaluated using statistical tools. For 
example, the probability that bank A will increase its interest rates in a year 
compared to bank B, or the probability that bank A will be more lenient if we get 
behind with payments. However, what if – based on past rate rises – bank A is 
50% more likely to raise its rates in a year, but bank B has a record of quickly 
foreclosing on delinquent mortgages. How do we weigh these disparate factors? 
Moreover, when dealing with larger institutions in a single free market, we may 
easily conclude that they are "all as bad as each other" (Roberts, 2012). None of 
this takes us any closer to deciding where to obtain our mortgage. However, we 
may have already established certain beliefs about the financial institutions 
around us – e.g., the people at bank C were very nice to deal with when we 
opened a savings account last year. Using this experiential data, we satisfy our 
"quest for certainty" in a way that avoids immersing ourselves in superfluous 
details that may be beyond our capacity or enthusiasm to understand anyway 
(Dewey, 1929, as cited in Miller, 1984, p.404). 
 
The receptor capabilities of a fly are rather extraordinary. Flies' eyes are believed 
to have quickest visual responsiveness of any creature on earth, enabling them 
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to track movements as much as five times more quickly than human eyes 
(University of Cambridge, 2012; Wardill, List, Li et al., 2012). However, the 
remarkableness of the "fly eye" is the last thing we are likely to contemplate as 
we spray insecticide and swat the little pests when they invade our homes. In 
Australia there is a chain of bread store which – to avoid being sued – I'll call 
'Breadx', which makes rather tasty bread products. I recently went to the Breadx 
store near my office, to buy a bread roll to eat on the train on the way home. To 
my disgust, there was a fly in the very cabinet where my chosen roll was located. 
As a child I was told that food is poisoned by flies, who lay their eggs on it and 
transfer germs to it from whatever dirty places they have visited before. This was 
therefore a huge dilemma for me. However, not wanting to be a slave to my 
cognitive heuristics (of course!) I reasoned that the fly had not been on the 
specific roll that I was eyeing, it might have only just entered the cabinet, and 
perhaps had not visited any rubbish bins that day. Later, while eating said roll, I 
felt rather proud of the victory of mind over emotion. Should I have been? 
 
It could reasonably be argued that my purchase of the roll represented the failure 
of confirmation bias to protect me from myself, or more particularly the non-
operation of confirmation bias at a time when it might have been helpful to me. 
Now I know that flies walking on food is a really bad thing – apparently the 
common house fly is better at transmitting viruses and other pathogens 
suspended in faeces "than any other substrate or medium" (Graczyk, Knight, 
Gilman & Cranfield, 2001, p.232) – but only because I went looking for that 
information while writing this chapter. If, instead, my knowledge of flies came from 
past experience of watching sick people covered in flies, or seeing flies living in 
the open toilets of the developing world, my belief about their role in adversity 
would be significantly stronger regardless of my understanding of the 
mechanisms at work. 
 
In simple terms, probabilistic science cannot give us certainty in most day-to-day 
decision-making, and questions like where to obtain a mortgage or whether to 
buy a bread roll that might have fly poo on it ultimately rest on our own individual 
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past experiences and the biases formed by those past experiences. In this way, 
confirmation bias enables us to make decisions that in some cases we could not 
otherwise make, and often we will never know whether we made the right 
decision – it's that uncertain. 
 
Hypotheses are not always helpful either 
 
Previously I described the 'Wason Selection Test' (Wason, 1968, as cited in 
Nickerson, 1998), where subjects must decide which two out of four cards will 
prove the truth of a proposition that a card with a vowel on one side will always 
have an even number on the other side. Although this test is routinely used to 
demonstrate flawed reasoning, in fact the specific test formulated by Wason is a 
subset of a broader probability equation, the likelihood that B will be true if A is 
true, and sometimes – e.g., in circumstances of sparsity, such as where A and B 
occur rarely – confirmation bias can lead to a rational determination using a 
positive test strategy (Oaksford & Chater, 1994, as cited in Perfors & Navarro, 
2009, p.2741). 
 
In the real-world, solving problems that are similar to the test formulated by 
Wason (1968 – see above) may be assisted by two alternative approaches, one 
based on 'falsification', the other based on 'expected information gain' (Austerweil 
and Griffiths, 2011, pp.501-2). Falsification involves asking the question that will 
most probably falsify the hypothesis (Popper, 1935/1970, as cited in Austerweil 
& Griffiths, p.502). Austerweil and Griffiths suggest that a positive test strategy 
(PTS) is more likely to result in falsification than a negative test strategy. Klayman 
and Ha (1987, as cited in Austerweil & Griffiths, p.522) showed how a PTS can 
be optimal if the "true rule" would only explain a small number of perceived 
outcomes. In other words, confirmation bias is beneficial in many circumstances 
because it favours a PTS that is more likely to result in falsification, and is 
consequently more likely to help us predict the next event, particularly where the 




Where a hypothesis cannot be determined because the rules of a test or situation 
are unknown, it is rational to maximise expected information gain by seeking 
information that adds to existing knowledge rather than necessarily reaching for 
the answer to the test or situation; where the world is perceived as deterministic, 
which equates to non-deterministic outcomes being rare, a PTS is rational 
(Austerweil & Griffiths, p.507). While this still leaves us with the fact that most 
people fail the Wason test – failure that is widely perceived in scientific terms as 
a shortcoming of human cognition – we can nonetheless surmise that 
confirmation bias and specifically a PTS as one manifestation of confirmation bias 
might instead be nature's way (refined through evolution) of equipping us to reach 
good enough decisions most of the time. As Navarro and Perfors say, "we might 
forgive human participants for following an optimal strategy that happens to fail 
in some cases" (2011, pp.130-1). 
 
Believing in God: a 'lazy way out', or a legitimate personal conviction? 
 
Richard Dawkins, who has written several popular books on scientific topics, is 
also a well-known atheist. Dawkins (1986, pp.140-141) discusses the remarkable 
complexity of DNA replication, and – in his view – the sheer impossibility of there 
being a creator who controls all aspects of the "machinery of replication" and 
evolution on planet earth. Twenty-five years later, Dawkins (2012, p.261) takes a 
similar stance in discussing the parable of Jesus turning water into wine: 
 
"[This feat] would violate some of the deepest scientific principles we know... 
Molecules of pure water would have to have been transformed into a 
complex mixture of molecules, including alcohol, tannins, sugars of various 
kinds and lots of others." 
 
Despite Dawkins' commitment to the logic of his scientific analysis, the 
persistence of religious belief in every part of the modern world continues 
undeterred. How do we reconcile this? Perhaps we have to conclude that science 
is not particularly useful when it comes to matters of faith. For a psychologist this 
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is a significant issue. On the one hand, we are scientists too, and the idea that 
some erroneous beliefs may be sustained by coincidences or selective 
acquisition of information should be abhorrent to us. However, we are also 
concerned with the mental health of individuals and communities, and we know 
that in hard times people cling to beliefs as a way of coping.  
 
Ultimately, we have to make a relative assessment of harm. While a belief in God 
or some other deity may offend Richard Dawkins, the reality is that such a belief 
is of itself seldom harmful. In the absence of knowledge, we will typically have 
uncertainty, and there is compelling evidence that in some circumstances 
uncertainty has adverse consequences for our mental health regardless of the 
dubiousness of the fictions we might adopt in place of it. Correspondingly, a spirit-
filled life sustained by confirmation bias may be a recipe for psychological well-
being, even if the association between the bias and mental health is not fully 
understood and implicitly endorses beliefs that cannot be proved by science 
(Ellison & Fan, 2008, p.269; Jackson & Bergeman, 2011, p.13; Kashdan & 
Nezlek, 2012, p.1532). 
 
Believing in ourselves and in what we can do 
 
Earlier on I mentioned the long-running television series Stargate, featuring the 
redoubtable "Macgyver" (Richard Dean Anderson) playing another role where 
human ingenuity wins the day. The popularity of the series is no doubt connected 
to the survival every week of the plucky team of humans that battles too-clever-
by-half aliens in far-flung corners of the galaxy. The arch-nemesis – at least for a 
few years – was the Goa'uld Anubis – the name plucked straight out of Egyptian 
mythology – who is smarter than any human being and has some very cool 
devices to zap people with. However, for a God, Anubis has incredibly bad luck. 
Every week that little band of humans, who he now knows individually by name, 





While we can easily pigeon-hole these sci-fi series as "harmless entertainment", 
they are nonetheless value-laden and influential in shaping our personal 
mythology and beliefs about the world (Langley, 2012, pp.93-94; Buckland, 2000, 
pp.5-6). Black and Barnes (2015), building on earlier studies that suggested a 
correlation between reading fiction and 'theory of mind' (Kidd & Castano, 2013, 
as cited in Black & Barnes, p.423), found the same effect in subjects who watched 
fictional television dramas. 
 
It follows that in everyday life, confirmation bias can strongly influence the extent 
to which we strive to achieve laudable goals. For example, the 'Pygmalion effect' 
has been postulated as the mechanism whereby positive reinforcement leads to 
improved academic performance (Panda, 2014, p.2). Put simply, the simple belief 
that one is capable of higher achievement leads to better outcomes. Although 
conceptually the Pygmalion effect is not necessarily a product of belief being 
reinforced by selection or interpretation of information available subsequently, in 
reality it is hard to distinguish the two. The effect came to the attention of the 
scientific community through the work of Rosenthal (1963), embracing the notion 
of 'self-fulfilling prophecy' but also relying on social cues reinforcing the 
expectation of higher achievement (Panda, pp.3 & 5). 
 
Fighting wars and not being killed 
 
One place where conscious attention to the truth of the situation can be fatal is at 
the 'front' of a war zone. Soldiers often face weeks of tedium, punctuated by short 
bursts of gun fire. In that situation, war becomes characterised by strange rituals 
and beliefs, including a fervent belief that the enemy – i.e., every man and women 
of them – is pure evil. Perhaps it is a necessary belief in wartime. Wright (2004, 
p.4) gives us the example of U.S. marines in Iraq, who he observed as a reporter, 
and the following illuminating paragraph: 
 
"At least one Marine in Colbert’s Humvee seems ecstatic about being in a 
life-or-death gunfight. Nineteen-year-old Corporal Harold James Trombley, 
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who sits next to me in the left rear passenger seat, has been waiting all day 
for permission to fire his machine gun. But no chance. The villagers 
Colbert’s team had encountered had all been friendly until we hit this town. 
Now Trombley is curled over his weapon, firing away. Every time he gets a 
possible kill, he yells, 'I got one, Sergeant!' Sometimes he adds details: 'Hajji 
in the alley. Zipped him low. I seen [sic] his knee explode!'" 
 
Confirmation bias persists in wartime just as readily as it does in peacetime. 
Young Corporal Trombley must believe the enemy is not like him, that when you 
kill "one" it's a just like shooting a wild pig in a hunt. It's not hard, as bullets come 
flying back, to assess those nameless others as evil. After all, they act like we 
expect them too, and there's no basis to see them as fellow humans. 
 
And then there's the belief about one's fellow soldiers (p.19): 
 
"Despite the frictions [between officers and enlisted men], Fick believes in 
the men he commands. “I have the best platoon,” he says repeatedly. Away 
from his men, Fick cannot talk about them without smiling." 
 
An unbiased appraisal would inevitably find a multitude of faults and weaknesses, 
but in these situations, belief becomes like a glue that ensures the marines watch 
each other’s backs and demonstrate total loyalty. 
 
3.9. Managing the influence of confirmation bias 
 
Confirmation bias cannot exist in splendid isolation. Necessarily and 
demonstrably, confirmation bias is a moderator of factors that can influence 
human behaviour – i.e., if an individual has formed a belief, confirmation bias 
operates to moderate the influence of subsequent information that this individual 
is exposed to. However, confirmation bias itself is also susceptible to moderation 
by other factors including other unconscious biases and conscious thinking 
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activities. This section explores some of those other factors, and how they may 




The utility or practical value of specific information has been proposed as having 
the potential to overcome confirmation bias. Knobloch-Westerwick (2008, p.2273, 
as quoted in Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012, p.172) suggests that 
'information utility' may be a representation of the extent to which we pay attention 
to information that could potentially address "challenges or gratifications" that are 
significant, highly likely to arise, need to be addressed soon or immediately, and 
may be influenced by the said information. Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman 
(2010, citing Purcell, Rainie, Mitchell, Rosenstiel and Olmstead) support the 
proposition that information utility may be more effective at overcoming 
confirmation bias affecting regular users of the internet, but Purcell et al. do not 
mention either information utility or confirmation bias specifically. 
 
The findings advanced by Purcell et al. (2010) include that the internet is now a 
more popular source of news than newspapers and radio, that typical internet 
users find the volume of news online "overwhelming" and are loyal to a small 
number of online news sources, and that internet users are interested in news 
because they believe that knowledge about the news can enrich their social 
interactions (pp.3-6). While those surveyed by Purcell et al. were undoubtedly 
attributing utility to information, it is a long stretch to say that utility in these 
circumstances was demonstrated to overcome a bias towards preferred news 
sources. Knobloch-Westerwick and Kleinman themselves acknowledge that the 
internet is read in a different way to more conventional news sources, and we 
might infer from their analysis that internet users' greater "effective[ness] in 





Assuming a two-layer approach to information control/attention, in some 
circumstances we may avoid being exposed to attitude-discrepant messages – 
i.e., the first layer operating to exclude information that we are not inclined to hear 
– while in other circumstances reification may operate as an effective second 
layer protection (against information that gets through the first layer) by 





It has long been known that cognitively demanding information is likely to be 
encoded into long-term memory more robustly than uncontroversial information 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975, pp.289-90). Oppenheimer (2008, 
p.237) identifies that the subjective challenge of processing such information into 
memory – i.e., the metacognitive cue known as 'disfluency' – is distinguishable 
from the objective level of difficulty associated with the information, a point 
repeated by Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer and Vaughan (2011, p.111). 
Oppenheimer describes that 'fluency' in terms of the "feeling of ease associated 
with a cognitive operation", as distinct from the actual cognitive task that is 
required (p.237). 
 
Although the studies conducted by Oppenheimer, and later Diemand-Yauman et 
al., were primarily concerned with memory, Oppenheimer makes the point that 
perceptual fluency operates more broadly such as when we are evaluating truth, 
likability and compatibility – i.e., fluency encourages an affirmative conclusion 
relying on heuristic cues, while disfluency encourages more thorough evaluation. 
Reber and Schwarz (1999, p.342) suggest that the effect of perceptual fluency is 
akin to the effect of familiarity. The premise here is that fluency elicits a comfort 
level that posits favourability. This takes us to Hernandez and Preston's 
conclusion that disfluency, while wholly metacognitive (and therefore subject to 
moderation itself by extracerebral forces) can interfere with, and potentially 






Biases frequently – perhaps always – operate in tandem with other biases, even 
biases of the same type. For example, I might be a juror in the criminal trial of a 
man charged with murder. The trial has been running for a week, and already I 
have formed two beliefs from the evidence that I have heard: 
 
(a) The defendant is capable of committing a murder; and 
(b) The defendant didn't commit the murder in question. 
 
This duality of belief may mean that I am concurrently open to information that is 
exculpatory ("he didn't do it") and damning ("he's capable of doing it"). The first 
belief effectively moderates the second belief or vice versa. This is like the 
situation where a second similar charge is being considered by a jury at the same 
time as the primary charge, as opposed to the charges being heard separately, 
and the possibility that the jury considering the two charges together is more likely 
to convict on the primary change (Leipold & Abbasi, 2006, as cited in Goodman-
Delahunty, Cossins & Martschuk, 2016, pp.46-7). 
 
It is virtually impossible to identify all the biases and cognitive heuristics that might 
be at play in a given situation, so we need to be cautious that in addressing one 
recognised bias we do not elevate the influence of another bias that has not been 
identified. For example, a person may have been bitten by a dog and now fears 
dogs. When that person sees a dog barking at some young children, he or she 
may misinterpret the situation as representing danger to the children even though 
the dog is well-secured and cannot get near them. In this case, there are almost 
certainly multiple biases affecting the person's behaviour. Bias-busting measures 
that address just one bias or belief may be ineffective, or may even worsen the 
situation, if they fail to consider other possible influences. Care must be taken in 




Chapter 4 – Discourse Analysis Theories and 
Methodologies 
 
This study is grounded in the 'interpretative paradigm' that interprets individual 
reality as a construct of human interactions, experiences, understandings and 
beliefs (Scotland, 2012, pp.11-13). This approach aids what is effectively an 
exploratory study, as there is no additional evidence or information available that 
can provide experiential context for the witnesses' statements to the Royal 
Commission. The interpretive paradigm facilitates the exposure of meaningful 
patterns and insights. In the present study, the interpretive paradigm is applied to 
witnesses' narratives that have been placed into the public domain. The logic of 
the study is inductive, following the theoretical background of the confirmation 
bias phenomenon described in chapters 2 and 3, using discourse analysis to 
consider and elucidate the operationalisation of the phenomenon. 
 
The meaning of 'discourse analysis' varies significantly across the different 
disciplines where the term is used. A good starting point may be to define 
'discourse' sans context, which for present purposes must be more than mere 
words strung together purposelessly. In this thesis the more informal term 
'narrative' is intended to have the same meantime as discourse. Some other 
definitions of discourse are: 
 
• "A continuous stretch of (especially spoken) language larger than a 
sentence, often constituting a coherent unit, such as a sermon argument 
joke or narrative" (Crystal, 1992, p.25, as cited in Täuschel, 2004, p.7).  
• "stretches of language perceived to be meaningful, unified and purposive" 
(Cook, 1989, p.156, as cited in Täuschel, 2004, p.7).  
• "a system of statements which constructs an object" (Parker, 1989, p.61, 
as cited in Wooffitt, 2005, p.146). 
 
Although some commentators suggest that a discourse must comprise more than 
one sentence (e.g., Nunan, 1993, p.6, as cited in Täuschel, 2004, p.10), this does 
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not appear to be universally accepted, and is not wholly logical. In some contexts, 
a single sentence can be full of meaning and intention. The issue is not the 
number of words or how they are arranged structurally, but rather how 
words/statements through their juxtaposition articulate an intention or purpose. 
 
Cook (1989, p.6, as cited in Täuschel, p.12) proposes that the focus of discourse 
analysis is the narrative of a person, and the "search for what gives discourse 
coherence." Coherence exists where the discourse is consistent with "normal" 
and "familiar" experiences that can be understood by the common-sense 
application of local knowledge (Täuschel, 2004, p.16, citing Yule, 1996, pp.84-
85). Täuschel notes that in "its full richness discourse analysis involves all the 
levels and methods of analysis of language, cognition, interaction, society and 
culture" (p.11). This unfettered scope is consistent with discourse being 
"analysed as a reflection of wider structural and social inequalities" (Wooffitt, 
2005, p.144). Wooffitt (p.94) also identifies the need for a critical approach to 
discourse analysis, even though the discipline is perhaps inherently critical. 
Wooffitt's point appears to be that to be taken seriously discourse analysis must 
demonstrate the intellectual rigour conventionally associated with "related critical 
approaches in social psychology" such as those advocated by Michel Foucault 
(Wooffitt, pp.94, 137 & 146). 
 
We are dealing here with pre-prepared statements, that in some cases are the 
subject of little or no cross-examination. In these cases, it would be right to 
observe that the person doing the communicating has the opportunity to craft 
narrative in a way that might diverge considerably from the more natural language 
arising in ex tempore narrative. However, that situation does not invalidate the 
narrative, it merely requires us to recognise the character of the narrative arising 
from its manner of creation: (Brown & Yule, 1983, p.5)  
 
"There are, of course, advantages for the [ex tempore] speaker. He can 
observe his interlocutor and, if he wishes to, modify what he is saying to 
make it more accessible or acceptable to his hearer. The writer has no 
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access to immediate feedback and simply has to imagine the reader's 
reaction." 
 
We might say that in a complex matter the preparation of a statement in advance 
enables the writer to cover all the ground that is desired to be covered, without 
the stressors of thinking on the spot. Even in a formal context such as courtroom, 
spoken narratives (unless rehearsed) are inevitably drawn from 'top of mind' 
without opportunity for reflection and revision. Writing on the other hand is 
"worked over" to produce an output carefully tailored for its intended purpose 
(Chafe, 1994, p.43). However, if all we have is writing then we must accept the 
limitation of that and move on with it. In relation to identifying the significance of 
relevant contexts, it is highly relevant to analysis of witness statements as 
discourse that the witness has a "legal status" in relation to the court or tribunal 
(in the present case, in relation to the Royal Commission) and the extant legal 
process (Wooffitt, 2005, p.22). 
 
Further important areas of divergence between informal writing and legal 
statements include the level of attention to spelling and grammar. In most cases, 
the spelling of words in a letter or personal journal will reflect the language 
abilities of the individual, whereas spelling in a legal statement will at least reflect 
the capabilities of a computer-based spell-checker. Grammar likewise. In 
addition, the careful use of structure to produce "ordered context" can improve 
the accessibility of the narrative, and rewording "naïve representation[s]" may 
also promote the desired objective (Di Donato, 2011, pp.123-4). For example, a 
lawyer might insert "clinical" in front of "psychologist" to slightly elevate the 
apparent status of a relevant expert, replace formal references to a person ("Mr..." 
or "Ms...") with the person's first name to indicate greater closeness, or portray a 
dodgy activity as if it were commonplace. As is the case with improving the 
grammar of a narrative beyond the native ability of the original author, this kind 
of "legitimation" may produce a slightly skewed impression in the mind of the 




A feature of cross-examination is how the lawyer has an "argumentative 
advantage" -- i.e., it is inherent in efficient cross-examination that the questioner 
controls the witness and elicits only anticipated responses, rather like the radio 
host who can "attack a caller's position without having to advance an alternative 
argument" (Wooffitt, 2005, p.198, citing Hutchby, 1996). However, the wily or 
determined witness is not wholly powerless, as cross-examination is often 
conducted imperfectly leaving opportunities for a witness to veer off into narrative 
that undermines the lawyer's advantage. In my experience, police officers can be 
particularly adept at eschewing the yes/no responses that cross-examination 
typically tries to elicit (e.g., "yes, but..."). 
 
Implications are often drawn from narratives. For example: "He is an Englishman, 
he is, therefore, brave" (Brown & Yule, p.31). The implication here is that all 
Englishmen are brave, which may be a fallacy but is nonetheless an expression 
of belief that may be significant in the broader understanding of the specific 
narrative. It is probably nonsensical to regard all Englishmen as brave, and so a 
pragmatic analysis may (for example, depending on other context) treat the 
discourse as prioritising "rhetorical appeal to the reader" and inviting the reader 
to share the presupposition that Englishmen are at least typically brave (Potter & 
Edwards, 1990, p.412, as cited in Wooffitt, 2005, p.81). The significance of this 
is that in undertaking discourse analysis we are often faced with narratives that 
seem rather certain in what we might infer from them. However, there is 
considerable danger in seizing on such inferences without a strong basis for 
believing them to be true. 
 
In relation to most narratives, some knowledge of context is essential. Täuschel 
(2004, p.14) identifies two difference main types of context: 
 
• Linguistic context, being "the language that surrounds or accompanies the 
piece of discourse under analysis", and  
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• Non-linguistic context aka experimental context, which is the external 
context where the discourse occurs. 
 
Non-linguistic context includes historical and circumstantial context, which might 
also be called "background knowledge" and particularly refers to "pre-existing 
knowledge structures" such as 'schemata' or 'scripts' that operate as a guide to 
understanding current situations (Täuschel, 2004, p.17). In some cases, context 
may be included selectively to lend strength to the credibility of the narrative (Di 
Donato, 2011, p.123). In other cases, discourse may have been constructed to 
conform with the expectations of other people (Pillemer, 1992, p.242, as cited in 
Wooffitt, 2005, p.109). While this thesis is not the place to debate the reliability of 
human memory, it is critical in undertaking discourse analysis to recognise the 
limits of perception and memory. There is considerable evidence that our ability 
to comprehensively assess and accurately record our experiences is rather 
limited (Chafe, 1994, p.22). Moreover, the 'reconstructive' nature of how we 
interpret fresh information based on existing schemas means that our ability to 
distinguish fact and fiction is diminished from the outset, and further diminished 
by the limitations of how we store memories -- the recall of "once-immediate 
experience inevitably entail[ing] a greater or lesser amount of invention" (Chafe, 
1994, p.33, citing for example Loftus, 1979). Discourse may therefore be 
unreliable as a "window" looking into our minds (Wooffitt, 2005, p,115). However, 
the utility of discourse analysis is unaffected by this, because ultimately the 
discourse once created takes on a life of its own. Therefore, the study of 
discourse is not an examination of the person or their memories but looks at what 
he or she does with language and how that can be related to the contexts and 
identified purposes of the discourse (Wooffitt, pp.115-6). Being able to describe 
certain matters in great detail sometimes has the effect of lending credibility to 
other matters touched on by the witness, even though that treatment is probably 
unwarranted (Bell & Loftus, 1989, as cited in Wooffitt, p.119). If we are looking 
for credibility, it needs to come from the context not the discourse. 
 
A challenge confronting any study involving discourse is that the context and 
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objectives of a specific narrative are a 'paradigm' that "necessarily focuses 
attention on certain phenomenon while obscuring others" (Burns & Carson, in 
Wodak & Chilton (Eds), 2005, p.288). Moreover, the availability of institutional 
strategies and practices to address specific problems may inherently influence 
the formulation of problems -- i.e., so they can be located within existing 
strategies and practices -- and narrow the scope of possible solutions (Nylander, 
2000, and Sutton, 1998, both as cited in Burns & Carson, 2005, p.291). In some 
situations, the problem-solving capability of existing strategies and practices may 
be so poor or ineffective that a crisis ensues (Burns & Carson, p.292). 
 
It is necessary to be alert for influences that may exacerbate bias in testimony. 
One obvious influence is the manner in which evidence is adduced -- i.e., by a 
written statement being read into the record, and in some cases cross-
examination of the witness -- because that scheme tends to favour some forms 
of expression and constrain others. Less obvious influences on testimony include 
the capacity of the witness to confront and articulate traumatic events, the 
sensitivity of non-witness actors to the wellbeing of witnesses, how non-witness 
actors perceive evidence in terms of relevance or probity, and decisions about 
cross-examination. For example, a lawyer's decision whether or not to cross-
examine a witness, and the extent of any cross-examination, inherently defines 
the scope of what the witness is allowed to say -- i.e., the discourse of the witness 
is expanded or confined by the decision of another actor. Where there is no cross-
examination, we are left with several possibilities: 
 
• the evidence of the witness was considered to be complete and accurate; 
 
• the evidence of the witness was considered to be unreliable to the extent 
that cross-examination would be pointless; and/or 
 
• the witness was considered to be vulnerable, and that cross-examination 




It is important to keep in mind that these witnesses were not on trial. The focus 
of the Royal Commission was the institutional (typically corporate or government 
agency) responses to child sexual abuse, and in the main the objective of hearing 
from individual witnesses (victims, parents of victims) was only to gain an 
understanding of what the institutions should have responded to. 
 
It is commonplace to find human bias represented in narratives, spoken and 
written, and discourse analysis is often a useful lens through which to view bias 
and evaluate it in its broader context. Van Dijk (1993, p.262, as cited in Wooffitt, 
2005, p.138) suggests that biases reflecting an individual's beliefs may be evident 
from an examination of the individual's discourses. 
 
In this study, where confirmation bias is a central focus, it is appropriate to go a 
step beyond exposing individual beliefs, to consider the nuances of bias and 
specifically how confirmation bias may be detected and its operation described in 
a specific situation. This research uses transcripts of data gathered from a public 
source. Having these transcripts, it is possible to respond to a critical question: 
what are the main tendencies in the narratives according to our understanding of 
confirmation bias as described in chapter 3. In the analysis of these hearing 
transcripts I have considered (for each narrative) the context of any belief, the 





Chapter 5 – Discourse Analysis of Witness Statements 
 
The Royal Commission heard from victims of child sexual abuse, parents of 
victims, co-workers of perpetrators, and managers of relevant institutions. The 
evidence was typically documented in advance by way of witness statements. 
When it came time for the evidence of a witness to be heard by the Royal 
Commission at hearing, the statement would be read into the record by the 
witness or another person such as the counsel (lawyer) assisting the Royal 
Commission. A witness present in person could then be cross-examined 
regarding his or her evidence. 
 
This chapter is broken into two parts, the first being the analysis of parental 
discourse – i.e., the narratives of parents, mainly mothers, who had a child 
abused by Jonathan Lord, and second the analysis of co-worker discourse. In 
most cases, the abuse was sexual. In some cases, it persisted for many months 
and only came to light after Mr Lord was arrested. Each case was an inestimable 
tragedy for the affected child and his family.  
 
It is important to note that the witness narratives analysed here are only the tip of 
iceberg – a small number, less than a dozen, representing the interests of the 
very large pool of Mr Lord's victims. Keep in mind always that these witnesses 
were not on trial, and there is nothing here to suggest that any of them were 
neglectful of children's safety, welfare or wellbeing. On the contrary, these 
narratives show parents and workers who wanted the best for the children in their 
care, and who believed that the YMCA Before and After School Care service 
afforded a safe and enriching experience for these children. Although in one 
sense the YMCA was on trial before the Royal Commission, the focus of the 
inquiry was towards the future and how to improve institutional responses to child 
sexual abuse.  
 
As signalled in the previous chapter, the following analysis of discourses is 
particularly concerned with how individual beliefs may have informed biases, 
76 
 
particularly confirmatory biases. To that end, I have considered here the contexts 
of beliefs, the language used by witnesses in describing their experiences, and 
what the witnesses' use of metaphors and idioms, exaggeration, and other 
rhetorical factors reveals in relation to their biases. 
 
5.1 Mothers and their sons 
 
Seven parents gave evidence in the Royal Commission's case study relating to 
Mr Lord. In each case except one, the witness was the mother of a boy enrolled 
in the YMCA before and after school care program. Girls were also enrolled in 
the program, but it appears that Mr Lord's abuse was directed towards boys only. 
The testimony of one mother ("AW") concerns her fears about her daughter 
having been abused, although no abuse of that child was able to be confirmed.  
 
The parent witnesses and their children are referred to by the unique 
pseudocodes (identifiers) allocated to them by the Royal Commission, for 
example "AN", "AO", "AX" etc. The original transcripts produced by the Royal 
Commission were not line-numbered, so line numbers have been added to my 
transcript data to aid the analysis. Accordingly, "AN.24" denotes line 24 of the 
transcript data comprising AN's evidence. See appendix 2 for the full list of 
witnesses and identifiers. 
 
Other people trusted him, so I did 
 
AN, the mother of victim AO, knew Jonathan Lord's mother Jill Yankos through 
her work. Mr Lord's mother had recommended Mr Lord as a babysitter for AO, 
and AN had engaged him in that capacity (lines AN.24-30): 
 
AN.24  Jill recommended Jon to me as a babysitter. She told me that 
Jonathan worked at a local YMCA and was 
AN.25  a supervisor there, was great with kids and needed the money. Jill 
was aware that I needed a babysitter, 
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AN.26  as I am a single mother and was working every Saturday in a real 
estate office. Jill Yankos was very 
AN.27  proactive in recommending her son to me as a babysitter, telling me 
how all the children loved Jonathan 
AN.28  and that he was great with all children. 
AN.29  I trusted and believed that if Jonathan Lord was a supervisor at the 
YMCA, he was more than qualified to 
AN.30  babysit [AO]… 
 
It is not suggested that Ms Yankos was in any way aware of Mr Lord's paedophilia 
or his abuse of young children. However, from Ms Yankos description of him Mr 
Lord appeared to AN to tick all the boxes as a person who would be suitable as 
a babysitter, and AN was therefore inclined to see Mr Lord as an answer to her 
difficulty securing care for AO on Saturdays when she had to work. AN describes 
Ms Yankos as "very proactive" in making her recommendation, inferring that Ms 
Yankos was pressing AN to use Mr Lord for babysitting. AN then goes on to 
emphasise that regardless of Ms Yankos' recommendation, AN had good reason 
to trust Mr Lord because he "was a supervisor at the YMCA." In other words, AN 
infers that as YMCA trusted Mr Lord as a supervisor it was okay for AN to trust 
Mr Lord as a babysitter. Nonetheless, AN's stated recall of Ms Yankos comments 
about how "all the children loved Jonathan" and "he was great with all the 
children" (and earlier "great with kids") suggest that these aspects of Ms Yankos 
recommendation resonated with AN and were influential in her decision making. 
 
Another mother, AX, also worked with Ms Yankos and similarly recounts a 
suggestion by Ms Yankos that Mr Lord could babysit her child: 
 
AX.16  Jill Yankos spoke about her son with me. She said that he loved kids 
and that he had always worked with  
AX.17  children. On numerous occasions she suggested that Jon could 
babysit my children. I never took Jill up  




This testimony is given in the context of the witness's son and [AN's] son both 
having subsequently been sexually abused by Mr Lord during YMCA activities. It 
is significant that the witness emphasises Ms Yankos making suggestions about 
Mr Lord babysitting the witness's children – i.e., on "numerous occasions..." It is 
also significant that the witness is similarly emphatic about her response – "I 
never" – viz: "I never took Jill up on that offer." In this way the witness is moving 
some responsibility to Ms Yankos, as the persistent offeror, herself as the 
determined refuser.  
 
AX.21  ... I knew that Jonathan Lord regularly babysat [AO] for [AN]. If [AP] 
went to  
AX.22  play at [AO]'s house, I knew that Jon may have been there, the 
person looking after the children, not  
AX.23  [AN].  
AX.24  It was established between [AN] and I that it really didn't matter if 
she or Jon were looking after the  
AX.25  boys, because we thought that they were in good care with Jon Lord  
 
Here again the witness shifts responsibility. It wasn't her decision alone to allow 
Mr Lord to look after her son, "it was established between [AN] and I... we thought 
that they were in good care with Jon Lord." However, this arrangement represents 
a significant deviance from the earlier "I never took Jill up on that offer" and infers 
that AX was in her mind placing some reliance upon the decision making of AN 
(mother of AO) when the boys were together at AN's home. 
 
In the case of witness AZ, it was her own son – AE, who later disclosed being 
sexually abused by Mr Lord – who had suggested to his mother that Mr Lord 
might babysit AE and his two siblings. AE and his siblings were attending another 
school that had its own vacation care program. During her testimony, AZ 
recounted the history of how her child came to be in the YMCA vacation care 




AZ.17  In April 2011, I enrolled two of my children into the YMCA vacation 
care program in Caringbah, run out of 
AZ.18  Laguna Street Primary School. They also attended YMCA in July 
2011 and September 2011 school 
AZ.19  holidays. I first enrolled them due to lack of available places at the 
vacation care program in our school. 
AZ.20  I recall my son in particular enjoying it, and as he was getting older, 
he was also able to go on excursions 
AZ.21  for children that were over eight. 
 
In the context of a narrative about the child's abuse, the reference to how the 
child came to be enrolled in the YMCA vacation care program is significant. The 
manner of referring to the decision suggests that the school program would have 
been preferred, but the YMCA was the only alternative. AZ does not give any 
detail about why enrolling the children in a vacation care program was necessary, 
or steps taken to check the YMCA program out, or investigation of other 
alternative programs that might have been available at the time. We might 
reasonably infer here that no specific enquiries were carried out, and the 
reference to the lack of available places in the school program is put forward as 
a way of suggesting that parental choice at the time was limited (by the school 
having insufficient places) and that if the school program had been available the 
abuse would not have occurred. The decision to enrol AE in the YMCA program 
is then further supported by the reference to AE enjoying the YMCA program, 
and that it involved activities that met his needs as a child "getting older." The 
witness specifically refers to AE being able to "go on excursions for children that 
were over eight" (my emphasis). At the time, AE was eight years old. Taken 
together, these two sentences put forward the proposition that AE's enrolment in 
the YMCA program was to some extent taken out of the witness's hands by the 
lack of places in the school program, but that fortuitously the YMCA program 
appeared to meet the child's needs at that time so the decision to enrol him in the 
YMCA program was justified. The use of the words "my son in particular enjoying 
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it" is notable because this indicates that AE was very happy attending the YMCA 
program, whereas his sister (the other sibling enrolled) might not have been as 
satisfied. It is known now that Mr Lord paid special attention to little boys. The 
witness does not comment on why her son enjoyed the YMCA program more 
than her daughter did. 
 
AZ.22  He told me how much he liked the carers, and one afternoon he said 
to me, "I would like Jon to babysit 
AZ.23  for us.” At the time, I didn't think this was particularly out of the 
ordinary, even though all of the other 
AZ.24  childcare centres and preschools that my children had previously 
attended had policies which prevented 
AZ.25  babysitting of children by staff. 
 
In the case of the child AJ, his mother AT describes how she came to place AJ 
at the after school care operated by YMCA at Carringbah: 
 
AT.23  A. We don't have any family living in Sydney, and I didn't know 
anyone well enough to trust to look 
AT.24  after my children at home, and I thought that the service would be 
safe and YMCA is a large organisation 
AT.25  and I thought it had a good reputation. The school advertised the 
service at our kindergarten 
AT.26  information night and held the service out to be a good service. There 
were signs on the school gate. 
 
In this situation, the YMCA service responded to AT's vulnerable position as the 
primary carer of her son who also needed to work to meet the financial needs of 
her family. 
 
As with the other mothers, AT placed great store in the standing of YMCA as a 
"large organisation" with a "good reputation." In particular, the school "held the 
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[YMCA] service out to be a good service" and promoted it. AT expresses all of 
this in the context of not knowing who to trust. The inference is that in the absence 
of other options it was reasonable to trust YMCA in view of that organisation's 
size and repute and also the effective endorsement of the YMCA service by the 
school. 
 
Although having trust in the integrity of a person or organisation may be regarded 
in a particular case as a prerequisite for giving that person or organisation a 
specific responsibility, trust does not of itself drive people to give out 
responsibility. In the ideal world, all parents making decisions about childcare 
would be, and feel, completely in control of their decision making, but the 
examples in this section allude to how little choice some parents may really have. 
In these examples, there is a theme of parents having to balance multiple 
demands on their lives, including work obligations and parenting responsibilities, 
and having limited alternatives to using a specific available service or person for 
childcare. 
 
He was "willing and available" 
 
From about December 2010, AN used Mr Lord as a babysitter for her son AO. As 
noted previously, the engagement of Mr Lord for this activity was recommended 
by his mother and AN trusted Mr Lord based on his YMCA role. Once Mr Lord 
was engaged in the babysitting role, he proceeded to secure AN's confidence: 
 
AN.42  In hindsight, I now see that Jonathan Lord groomed me as well as 
[AO]. Jonathan was always willing and 
AN.43  available to help and became like a member of the family. He would 
occasionally drop by the house and 





AN connects "willing and available" with becoming "like a member of the family. 
This theme of being helpful and generous with his time is emphasised, such as 
where AN describes Mr Lord "talking with" her and watching television with her 
son, activities that build familiarity and trust. 
 
AN.44 … He would sometimes lend 
AN.45  [AO] things, such as video games. He would sometimes bring things 
for [AO] for him to do while he was 
AN.46  babysitting, such as making models. 
 
"Lending" in this case denotes another form of perceived generosity, involving 
the provision of items by Mr Lord that AN infers were desirable to her son, and 
were also desirable to AN in the sense that she appreciated seeing her son 
playing happily. Similarly, with the model-making, Mr Lord is portrayed as 
demonstrating generosity, and apparent thoughtfulness. 
 
Other mothers record similar involvement with Mr Lord. For example, AX's son 
went to a movie night that Mr Lord arranged: 
 
AX.32  ... Jon Lord told me he was organising the event and I thought it was 
fine that the children were  
AX.33  going to a YMCA movie night with the organiser, even though neither 
[AP] nor [AO] attended YMCA  
AX.34  childcare. 
 
The terminology here is curious. Mr Lord "was organising the event" and it was 
"fine that the children were going to a YMCA movie night with the organiser." The 
witness avoids a narrative where she has entrusted her son to Mr Lord; instead 





AX.37  ... At 10pm, I texted Jon to see if everything was all right, as it was a 
bit  
AX.38  late. Jon replied, saying that they were nearly finished and that [AP] 
would be home shortly. Jon  
AX.39  dropped [AP] home later that evening. 
 
Here AX portrays that she was a responsible parent, ringing up at 10pm to check 
that her son was okay. AX then records how she was reassured by Mr Lord – i.e., 
"nearly finished... home shortly" – and the fact of her son subsequently being 
dropped home by Mr Lord. It was therefore a promise kept by Mr Lord, and 
obviated any need for AX to be concerned. There is a theme here of a parent 
representing herself as having done what a responsible parent might be expected 
to do, in the context (at the time of providing her evidence to the Royal 
Commission) of her later-acquired knowledge regarding Mr Lord's crimes. 
 
Another mother, AU who had three children enrolled at the YMCA before and 
after school care service at Caringbah Public School in 2011, describes Mr Lord's 
behaviour towards the children and how the children felt about Mr Lord: 
 
AU.23  I understood from speaking with my children that they had grown 
very fond of Jonathan Lord because 
AU.24  he made a big effort to entertain them and pay them attention. 
AU.25 I recall that he would often cuddle them or be playful with them by 
carrying them on his shoulders. 
AU.26 When we arrived in the mornings my children would often be the first 
ones at the centre, and Jon would 
AU.27 allow them into the kitchen to get whatever they wanted for breakfast. 
There were occasions when I 
AU.28 dropped my kids off at before school care and Jonathan Lord had 
opened the centre alone. As a result, 





A significant theme of AU's discourse is Mr Lord's availability and willingness to 
engage, expressed with rhetorical emphasis – e.g, "big effort", "often cuddle 
them", and "whatever they wanted for breakfast." There is an obvious question 
here (that we cannot answer) as to AU's knowledge of the YMCA rules against 
physical contact between workers and children, and whether she would have 
realised that Mr Lord's conduct was contrary to those rules. However, AU's 
specific recollection of this conduct in the context of her children's described 
fondness for Mr Lord suggests that AU saw the conduct in a positive light, 
perhaps because it indicated special treatment for her own children over others. 
 
The rhetorical emphasis given to aspects of Mr Lord's conduct continues when 
AU is discussing Mr Lord's attentiveness to one of her children and herself on 
other occasions (my emphasis here): 
 
AU.53  ... I knew that 
AU.54  Jonathan Lord had paid a lot of attention to [AM]. There was one 
weekend in or about June 2011 where 
AU.55  Jonathan Lord had made an arrangement with [AM] to come and 
watch him play football on a Saturday. 
AU.56  At the time I did not think it was suspicious. I just saw him as a 
young guy who liked kids. Jonathan 
AU.57  spent a lot of time trying to get to know me and would inquire as to 
how my university study was going. 
 
In this way, Mr Lord is portrayed as generous and selfless, and therefore by 
implication someone who could be trusted by AU. The words "I just saw him as a 
young guy who liked kids" denote a kind of normalcy – i.e., Mr Lord did not stand 
out as unusual or deviant in AU's perception of him. Similarly, Mr Lord befriending 
AU and asking AU about her university study is implied as something a caring 
person would do, and therefore not consistent with a person having nefarious 




The kids didn't say anything 
 
Mr Lord babysat AO. AO's mother AN describes how the children were keen to 
spend time with Mr Lord: 
 
47  [AO] and other kids appeared to love Jonathan. He came to [AO]'s laser 
tag birthday party voluntarily 
48  and unpaid. [AO] and his friends fought about who was going to be on 
Jonathan's team and who would 
49  get to ride in Jonathan's car. Jonathan had a way with children. 
 
Overt generosity again, this time "voluntarily" coming to a child's birthday party, 
giving up his time and not expecting any reward for it. From an adult perspective, 
the children's conduct – AO and his friends fighting about who would be on Mr 
Lord's team and who would go in his car – is portrayed as compatible with a belief 
that nothing untoward occurring. 
 
Keeping in mind that AN's narrative is generated after the abuse has been 
disclosed, it appears likely that AN is embarrassed about being duped by Mr Lord 
and the harm he has done to her son. Although the words "had a way with 
children" are put forward as a summation of the behaviours described, they may 
also be viewed as excusatory – i.e., suggesting that Mr Lord had a unique or rare 
talent in dealing with children, and that AN should be excused for not seeing past 
that talent. In this way, Mr Lord is portrayed as the conniving manipulator who 
duped innocent parents and children. 
 
Later on, AN recounts AO's response when she asked him why he hadn't spoken 
up about the abuse: 
 
AN.92  [AO] trusted Jonathan Lord and he saw that I also trusted and relied 
on him. [AO] was so embarrassed 
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AN.93  to tell me about what had happened. On the night that he first told 
me about it, I asked him why he 
AN.94  hadn't told me, and he said, "Because I didn't think you'd believe 
me." I think that he saw that I liked 
AN.95  Jonathan and thought that he might get in trouble or make me upset 
if he said anything. 
 
Here, AN is being protective of her son, effectively saying that he shouldn't be 
criticised for not speaking up because she had created an environment where it 
was hard for him to speak up. 
 
Another parent, AS, describes how her son AH attended the YMCA vacation care 
centre in Carringbah at least twice in each school holiday period from July 2009 
to October 2011. It was later learned that AH had been sexually abused by Mr 
Lord, a staff member at the centre, during the 2010-11 Christmas vacation, and 
also in April 2011 and July 2011. On at least one occasion, the abuse occurred 
when Mr Lord was seated between AH and his sister on a bus taking the children 
on an excursion. 
 
AS noticed that in early 2011 AH started to behave differently: 
 
AS.79  From around the beginning of 2011, I observed that [AH] started 
rejecting physical contact with people, 
AS.80 including his dad and his grandparents. He wouldn't kiss, cuddle or 
handshake. This affected his 
AS.81  relationships with his father and his grandparents. 
AS.82  [AH] became increasingly anxious and clingy with me. 
AS.83  I was the only person who could get close to him. He would come to 
our bedroom six times in a night, 
AS.84  and in the end he would just climb into bed and would just want to 




However, AS records that AH still wanted to attend the YMCA centre, and "would 
speak a lot about Jonathon Lord." Mr Lord was also known as "Jon." The witness 
told the Commission that AH "would always speak about Jon in positive terms." 
 
It was similar in the case of AE, the child of AS. As noted above, AE had himself 
proposed Mr Lord as a person who could babysit AE and his siblings. Although 
this suggestion was not taken up, and AS was aware that other childcare centres 
and preschools previously attended by her children "had policies which prevented 
babysitting of children by staff" (lines AS.24-25), AS "didn't think this [babysitting 
suggestion] was particularly out of the ordinary." AS records that AE continued to 
enjoy attending the YMCA events: 
 
AS.29  I remember the day that my son went on his excursion very clearly. 
He was eight and he was extremely 
AS.30  excited, and he was extremely excited to be going to the rock 
climbing centre. When he came home, he 
AS.31  told me that he and his friend had gotten special treatment from 
Jonathan Lord, who had apparently 
AS.32  bought them both hot chips and cookies from McDonald's. 
AS.33  Again, I didn't think this was particularly suspicious at the time, 
although I had packed lunch and I do not 
AS.34  recall that the excursion was supposed to stop on the way home. 
 
Here, similarly to the other cases above, the child is portrayed as having been 
keen about engaging with the planned activity, and happy to be the beneficiary 
of "special treatment" by Mr Lord. Writing her narrative after the abuse of AE has 
been disclosed, AS effectively pre-empts issues that might have raised suspicion 
– i.e., the packed lunch and whether the excursion was supposed to stop on the 
way home – by recording these factors at the same time as saying that she did 





The persistence of belief 
 
In about September 2011, Mr Lord visited AN (mother of AO) accompanied by 
his own mother, Ms Yankos. It was disclosed by Ms Yankos that Mr Lord had 
been suspended from working at the YMCA "because a child made an 
allegation... that Jon touched him inappropriately on the bus." However, AN's 
belief in Mr Lord was not shaken. AN recalls saying: 
 
72  How could they make that allegation against you? We need to get you 
a lawyer. There's a guy in 
73  Cronulla I can recommend. 
 
AN is candid about her trust in Mr Lord, and her bias against information contrary 
to her pre-existing belief: 
 
80  At the time of the above conversation, I still had total trust in Jonathan. 
It never crossed my mind that 
81  the alleged inappropriate touching could have actually happened. 
82  Jill said that they had gone to see a solicitor and she asked me to provide 
a character reference for 
83  Jonathan, which I agreed to do. 
 
Later, after reflecting on the conversation, AN spoke to her son, who tragically 
disclosed that he had been abused by Mr Lord "every Saturday since the first 




Twelve employees and former employees of the YMCA gave evidence in the 
Royal Commission's case study relating to Mr Lord. However, several of these 
were involved in management capacities, such as to give evidence about the 
systems employed by the YMCA, and had little or no direct involvement with Mr 
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Lord. The primary focus of this analysis is co-workers who worked closely with 
Mr Lord or at least had relevant contact with him in the YMCA workplace where 
he was employed. I have identified four such workers. 
 
The usual names of the co-workers were associated with their evidence, and I 
have therefore used their names in this analysis. The Royal Commission did not 
make any findings against these co-workers, and it is clear from their evidence 
that they were universally devastated by Mr Lord's abuse of the children in the 
YMCA's care.  
 
He was "a great worker… very enthusiastic" 
 
YMCA employee Danielle Ockwell ("DO"), talking about how she felt betrayed by 
Mr Lord's abuse of the children in their care when that abuse came to light, spoke 
of Mr Lord's inspirational approach and how he was seen by others: 
 
DO.581 … he made me believe that we had this amazing centre 
DO.582 where the children were safe and happy, and he came across to 
parents as a lovely guy… 
  
Another YMCA employee, Chloe Starr ("CS") worked with Mr Lord shortly before 
he moved to the Caringbah centre. Although "in hindsight" Ms Starr agreed that 
Mr Lord had tended to focus on "some children more than others" (lines CS.320-
321), one factor that really stood out was his enthusiasm: 
 
CS.323 Q. In hindsight, is there any other observation that you had made 
of him that you now consider in a 
CS.324 different light? 
CS.325 A. At the time when I was being trained by him, his enthusiasm I 
just thought was - I just thought he 
CS.326 was a great worker and he was very enthusiastic about his job and 
I just thought he had a great passion 
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CS.327 for his job. But now, when I look back and I have learnt about 
grooming, I see that that may have been 
CS.328 grooming. 
 
The possibility that this perception of enthusiasm was misconceived was also 
identified in relation to Mr Lord undertaking babysitting: 
 
CS.331 Q. You say in paragraph 22 that you are now suspicious of - 
however, you weren't earlier - how much he 
CS.332 babysat? 
CS.333 A. Yes. 
CS.334 Q. That didn't occur to you at the time - a 24-year-old young man 
who was spending his weekends 
CS.335 babysitting young boys? 
CS.336 A. At the time, no. Again, he was so enthusiastic about children; I 
just assumed that that's what he 
CS.337 enjoyed doing. 
CS.338 Q. You refer in your statement to him having babysitting jobs 
arranged for Friday, Saturday and Sunday 
CS.339 nights? 
CS.340 A. Yes. So as we would prepare the afternoon tea before the 
children had arrived, often you would 
CS.341 speak about the staff, what you did on the weekend, and things like 
that, and he would always say he 
CS.342 was basically babysitting. 
 
However, Mr Lord's babysitting did not trigger any alarm bells for Ms Starr, 
because it was possible to draw a logical connection between his enthusiasm 





Alicia Dellaca ("AD") started working for YMCA as a casual childcare assistant in 
about 2006, although that was initially just for about a week before she went 
overseas for 6 weeks. When she returned from her trip, a childcare assistant 
position was available, and the witness says she commenced working in that 
capacity and was then working with Mr Lord. In her written statement to the Royal 
Commission, Ms Dellaca refers to a conversation she had with Mr Lord, where 
Mr Lord said he had a "soft spot for kids and boys" (lines AD.800-801). Ms Dellaca 
says this conversation was when she first met Mr Lord and she "thought he has 
very clear goals and aspirations for his career within the childcare sector" (lines 
AD.805-806). Under cross-examination Ms Dellaca then asserts that this initial 
conversation influenced her thinking when she observed Mr Lord with children: 
 
AD.809 A. Any time I would - as I've listed in my statement, any time I would 
see him paying attention to 
AD.810 children or going above and beyond in his job role or wanting to stay 
behind to finish off games, that first 
AD.811 statement that he made to me made me believe that his intentions 
were good and that, in fact, he just 
AD.812 wanted to have a positive impact on children's lives, and I thought 
that was a - at the time, I thought that 
AD.813 was a realistic thing and he gave me no reason to believe otherwise. 
 
In terms of forming a bias, it seems very likely that it was this initial conversation 
with Mr Lord that conditioned the witness to accept his subsequent behaviour in 
a positive light rather than as the grooming that it was. We cannot draw any 
conclusion here about what other people might think, hearing Mr Lord speaking 
of his "soft spot for kids and boys", but the witness is candid that this initial 
conversation convinced her of Mr Lord's bona fides. This is a good example of 
the 'primacy effect', discussed in chapter 3, where initial observations or 
information received by an individual about an issue tend to inform the 




It appears that on some occasions Mr Lord would also break or stretch the rules. 
For example, another co-worker Carine Beer ("CB") recounts how Mr Lord used 
his mobile phone at work and allowed a child to play with the phone even though 
both of these were against the rules: 
 
CB.336 Q. Were there any other occasions when you worked with him 
where you saw him using his mobile 
CB.337 phone? 
CB.338 A. Yes. 
CB.339 Q. Were there occasions when you saw him having children playing 
with his mobile phone? 
CB.340 A. Only a special needs child. That's the only one I saw. 
 
What is the significance of the child being “only a special needs child”? It is not 
clear at this stage of the narrative whether the witness is merely describing the 
“only” child that she saw, or is attributing some significance to the fact of the child 
being “special needs.” In the latter case, this could be an example of a fallacious 
justification for another person breaching known rules – i.e., evidence of Mr Lord's 
misconduct being framed as a sign of his exceptional dedication to children. This 
may fall within the scope of argumentum ad verecundiam (fallacious appeal to 
authority) in the sense that Mr Lord could have been regarded by Ms Beer as the 
best authority on what conduct was appropriate in the circumstances, or 
alternatively a negative fallacy ad consequentiam (argument based on 
consequences). The latter construction could derive from Ms Beer perceiving the 
possibility of unfair consequences for Mr Lord and the child if the rules were 
applied strictly. The cross-examination of Ms Beer continued: 
 
CB.341 Q. You said earlier that as part of your employment process as 
coordinator; you were told that there 
CB.342 were to be no mobile phones at work? 
CB.343 A. Yes. 
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CB.344 Q. So what did you do when you saw Jonathan Lord with his mobile 
phone? 
CB.345 A. Nothing. 
CB.346 Q. You didn't report it to anyone? 
CB.347 A. I may have. I'm not sure. 
CB.348 Q. If you did, would it have been in writing? 
CB.349 A. No. 
CB.350 Q. You would have done it orally? 
CB.351 A. Yes. 
CB.352 Q. Do you have a recollection of having done that? 
CB.353 A. I can't remember, no. 
 
The witness appears to have a poor memory of the occasion. Initially she says 
she did nothing when she saw Mr Lord with his phone. Then she is asked a 
leading question at line CB.346, that may have prompted her to consider the 
possibility that she made a report. However, she is clear about not having made 
a report in writing, because that is not what she would have done. She’s relying 
on her memory of what she would usually have done, not any memory of the 
specific occasion. When asked expressly whether she recalled making an oral 
report, she gives an ambiguous response – “I can’t remember, no.” 
 
CB.354 Q. Well, did you think, when you saw him with his mobile phone, 
that what he was doing was against 
CB.355 the rules 
CB.356 A. It was for a special needs child and the child really loved The 
Wiggles, so it was just The Wiggles on it 
CB.357 for him. 
CB.358 Q. So did you think it was against the rules? 
CB.359 A. Yes. 
CB.360 Q. So did you then tell a supervisor that you had seen him – 




This is the end of the cross-examination about the phone at that stage. Although 
the witness is vague, when she is able to be, such as about whether she told 
anyone, when it comes to the crunch she knows full well that Mr Lord having the 
phone was against the rules and that she failed to tell a supervisor. No more “I 
can’t remember.” 
 
The kids didn't say anything 
 
Mr Lord's co-worker, Alicia Dellaca observed that some of the children – 
specifically the boys – "gravitated to" Mr Lord: 
 
AD.823 A. I saw that he would often have certain children that he was more 
likely to do activities with, whether 
AD.824 it be playing sport games or whatnot. It just seemed that the same 
children seemed to gravitate to him. 
AD.825 Q. What did you think of that? 
AD.826 A. At the time I thought that was typical of boys. 
AD.827 I thought the boys that gravitated to him would have done so 
because he was one of two male staff 
AD.828 members, so I thought that explained the behaviour. 
AD.829 Q. And he wasn't particularly interested in playing with the little 
girls? 
AD.830 A. No. 
AD.831 Q. Did that give rise to any thought in you? 
AD.832 A. No, it didn't 
 
Although Ms Dellaca had expressed some concerns about "other people thinking 
[Mr Lord] had favourites" she was not otherwise concerned about the behaviour 
at that time: 
 
AD.838 Q. You were not aware that children sitting on laps provided an 




AD.840 You didn't think about it in those terms, given your training? 
AD.841 A. No, I believe I thought, considering the fact it was done in such 
a public forum in clear view of other 
AD.842 staff, I guess I believed that grooming and other sexually 
inappropriate behaviours would be done out of 
AD.843 sight. 
 
It was put to Ms Dellaca that before the "Lord incident" she "had had a deal of 
training concerning child safety issues and risks" (lines AD.935-936). The witness 
effectively denied having (back then) the necessary understanding to recognise 
Mr Lord's visible behaviours as grooming, but spoke of gaining an improved 
understanding subsequently: 
 
AD.954 Q. What have you gained from your experience as opposed to the 
training? 
AD.955 A. My experience has given me a first-hand example of how 
discreet grooming can be and how 
AD.956 manipulative paedophiles can be. I believe those two factors 
contribute to my now understanding. 
 
The persistence of belief 
 
It is recorded above that Mr Lord's co-worker, Alicia Dellaca formed a positive 
view of Mr Lord's intentions from his assertions that he had a "soft spot for kids 
and boys" (lines AD.800-801) and his apparently "very clear goals and aspirations 
for his career within the childcare sector" (lines AD.805-806). In another 
exchange, Ms Dellaca says Mr Lord questioned the 'no touching' rules: 
 
AD.780 I recall working with Jon Lord one Thursday afternoon at the St Pat's 
centre, and he said to me, "I think 
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AD.781 that it's just so bizarre that they say it's important to build strong 
relationships with families and kids and 
AD.782 to be a good role model for them yet the rules say 'don't let kids 
come close to you' and 'don't do this or 
AD.783 that'. 
AD.784 I said to him, "You can have a strong relationship as a role model 
with them without physically touching 
AD.785 them, it's about protecting yourself and the 
AD.786 children." I remember thinking to myself, "this isn't rocket science 
Jon, why is this even a dilemma". 
 
It seems that the witness came close to seeing Mr Lord's comments as 
concerning, but ultimately dismissed them as him being a bit dramatic rather than 
an indication of an issue that she should have been alarmed by. Even when she 
thought it was "odd" and "strange" that Mr Lord was coming to the St Pat's centre 
when he was not rostered on, the witness was not sufficiently alarmed by that 
conduct to challenge it (lines AD.787-794). 
 
Similarly, despite several incidents that might potentially have given cause for 
concern, another co-worker Danielle Ockwell did not regard them as sufficiently 




DO.180 Q. Did you see Jonathan Lord hugging children? 
DO.181 A. Maybe on the odd occasion, yes. 
DO.182 Q. What did you do on the odd occasion you saw him hugging 
children? 
DO.183 A. I would do nothing. 
DO.184 Q. Even though you thought that was unnecessary touching? 




Here we have conduct by Mr Lord that Ms Ockwell regards as "unnecessary", but 
not raising concerns that needed to be reported. In the context of a belief that Mr 
Lord was up to no good (if that belief had existed) we can imagine that Ms Ockwell 
would have been more inclined to report the touching. At the risk of falling into 
fallacious error, it may be reasonable to infer that Ms Ockwell's thinking at the 
time was informed by the context of her belief as to Mr Lord's good intentions. 
 
Focusing on specific children- 
 
DO.198 … I would often spread myself around the whole centre and 
DO.199 interact with every child, so it made it quite difficult on my job when 
he would only focus on seven or so 
DO.200 children and I had to focus on the rest. 
DO.201 Q. There is a difference, isn't there, Ms Ockwell, between that 
making it difficult for you to do your job 
DO.202 and making you a bit uncomfortable? 
DO.203 A. Yes. 
DO.204 Q. What was it that made you a bit uncomfortable? 
DO.205 A. I just thought that him not going to other children was a bit - you 
know, it was strange, because when 
DO.206 we work in childcare; we have to look after all the kids. But yes. 
DO.207 Q. Did you share your views with anyone that you thought it was 
strange? 
DO.208 A. No, I did not. 
 
The words "made you a bit uncomfortable" were put to Ms Ockwell under cross-
examination and so were not her own words, but she effectively adopts them in 
describing Mr Lord's conduct as "strange." However, Ms Ockwell's concerns 
appear to be driver by operational considerations – the need "to look after all the 
kids" – rather than child safety considerations. Put simply, Ms Ockwell's 
interpretation of the situation was in the context of expecting Mr Lord to pull his 
weight in the centre, and there was no heuristic motivation to interpret the 




Child's picture on Mr Lord's mobile phone- 
 
DO.234 ... I saw that the screensaver on Jon's phone was a picture of [AF], 
who was a child in vacation 
DO.235 care. I said to Jonathan Lord, "Oh that's [AF] from vacation care" 
and Jon said "Yes, that's the boy. I've 
DO.236 forgot his name." I didn't say anything else but I thought that it was 
a bit odd for him to have a child from 
DO.237 the centre as his screensaver. 
 
Ms Ockwell doesn't identify this as improper or aberrant behaviour by Mr Lord, 
just that it was "a bit odd." This particular terminology – i.e., "a bit" - tends to 
downplay the oddness and excuse the failure to inquire more about the picture 
on the phone. The use of words like "strange" and "odd" appears likely to 
represent a subconscious minimisation of seriousness, that may seek to avoid 
accountability for non-reporting. In relation to confirmation bias, this situation may 
suggest that Ms Ockwell's established perception of Mr Lord as trustworthy led 
to a failure to test the "discrepant evidence" – i.e., there was a failure to consider 
that Mr Lord having the child's picture on his phone might have indicated improper 




DO.241 On another occasion, Jon had told me that he was going to babysit 
[BA]. The following day he called me 
DO.242 on my mobile and told me about it. I asked him how it had gone and 
he said, "Yeah, it was good, [BA] is 
DO.243 a really good kid.” I said, "Yeah he is good" and Jon replied, "Yeah, 
I love him." 
DO.244 I thought that was strange and that it was something that you 
shouldn't say. But at the time, I just 
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DO.245 thought that Jon was a loving and friendly guy and that was just his 
personality. 
DO.246 Q. Ms Ockwell, you didn't tell anyone else at work at the YMCA 
about the discussion with Jonathan Lord 
DO.247 in relation to [BA], did you? 
DO.248 A. No, I did not. 
DO.249 Q. You didn't tell anyone about having seen [AL] on his lap for most 
of the day? 
DO.250 A. No, I did not. 
 
Once again, a non-reported situation is somewhat minimised by use of the word 
"strange" rather than a term that would regard the situation more seriously. 
Although a connection can be made between Mr Lord's comments about the first 
boy and Mr Lord subsequently having another boy on his lap "for most of the day" 
it is also possible to separate these matters – i.e., different children, different 
activity – which makes it relatively easy to disregard the connection if there is no 
existing belief that would promote concerns about the overall situation. 
 
Being fired from working at a children's summer camp- 
 
DO.255 Q. In paragraph 24 you say that Jonathan Lord told you, not long 
before he was arrested, that he had 
DO.256 been fired from a summer camp? 
DO.257 A. Yes, that's correct. 
DO.258 Q. Can you tell us the context in which you had that conversation 
with him? 
DO.259 A. It was during before school care. I was actually going to apply to 
summer camp because I was 
DO.260 interested in doing it. I had mentioned that to him, and he then told 
me that he was involved in a camp. 
DO.261 I obviously began to ask questions about the camp, like what was 
it like and he then told me that he had 
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DO.262 been sent home from camp because he was caught with a boy one 
on one, but he said that the camp 
DO.263 had misunderstood him. 
DO.264 Q. What did you understand him to mean by being caught "one on 
one" with a boy? 
DO.265 A. Well, I just know, working in childcare, you are not supposed to 
be one on one, so I just thought that 
DO.266 he happened to get caught just with a child and they didn't approve. 
DO.267 Q. You didn't tell anyone in management or a supervisory role about 
that conversation? 
DO.268 A. No, I did not. 
DO.269 Q. Why not? 
DO.270 A. I just didn't really think much of it at the time. 
DO.271 Q. Well, you knew to be one on one was the wrong thing to do? 
DO.272 A. Yes. 
DO.273 Q. And he was telling you that he had done the wrong thing so as 
for him to have been fired working 
DO.274 with children before he came to the YMCA? 
DO.275 A. Yes. 
DO.276 Q. You didn't think that was an important thing that your managers 
needed to know? 
DO.277 A. I guess, looking at it now, yes. At that time, when he told me, I 
just - he told me that, you know, they 
DO.278 misunderstood, and I just trusted him. 
 
Much of the context here is of limited import, but there is an interesting aspect to 
this which is Mr Lord's self-reporting of the dismissal from the summer camp 
position. Although disclosure of this history by Mr Lord might be seen as contrary 
to his own interests, by making the disclosure to Ms Ockwell voluntarily and with 
no apparent pressure to do so he is both maintaining control of the narrative and 
promoting himself as an honest, forthright person who has nothing to hide. The 
manner of the disclosure may have had the perverse effect of building rather than 
101 
 
diminishing Ms Ockwell's trust in Mr Lord. Ms Ockwell acknowledges that she 
trusted Mr Lord and did not think to refer the disclosure to her employers. 
 
Babysitting for free- 
 
DO.435 [in relation to] babysitting [BA], … [BA]'s mother being told by 
Jonathan Lord that if she can't afford it, 
DO.436 he will do it for free; do you see that? 
DO.437 A. Yes. 
DO.438 Q. Did that strike you as unusual, that a childcare assistant, who 
we all know doesn't earn a lot of 
DO.439 money, was prepared to babysit for free? 
DO.440 A. No. 
DO.441 Q. It didn't? 
DO.442 A. I didn't think it was unusual. 
DO.443 Q. Had you ever babysat any of the children at the YMCA for free? 
DO.444 A. No, I didn't. 
DO.445 Q. You didn't think it odd that a 24-year-old man would be offering 
to babysit an eight-year-old boy for 
DO.446 free? 
DO.447 A. I just thought that he was just a nice guy. 
DO.448 Q. What would you think now if a 24- or 25-year-old man wanted to 
sit one of the children that you 
DO.449 worked with for free? 
DO.450 A. I would be concerned. 
 
Although the cross-examination here does not test whether Ms Ockwell believed 
that babysitting is a 'job' that should typically be remunerated, we might 
reasonably infer that she did not regard babysitting as a normal part of her own 
work, and therefore did not regard it as a normal part of Mr Lord's work as a 
childcare assistant. In that context, the fact of Mr Lord being willing to go 'above 
and beyond' in this manner might in some circumstances have rung alarm bells 
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for Ms Ockwell, but an adverse interpretation of Mr Lord's conduct was not tested 
due to the primacy effect of Ms Ockwell's trust in Mr Lord and her perception of 
him as "just a nice guy." 
 
Ms Ockwell then acknowledges to the Royal Commission that she regarded Mr 
Lord as a close friend. This friendship and its implications were explored through 
cross-examination, leading to the following exchange: 
 
DO.618 Q. It is fair to say, isn't it, that until the time that you learnt of the 
kinds of things that Mr Lord had been 
DO.619 charged with, it simply did not cross your mind for a single moment 
that any of the conduct that was 
DO.620 playing out right before your eyes was anything other than him 
being an affectionate, enthusiastic 
DO.621 childcare worker? 
DO.622 A. Yes, I trusted him. 
DO.623 Q. And you have said that a few times now, but just to complete 
that, you trusted him to keep the 
DO.624 children safe? 
DO.625 A. Yes, I did. 
DO.626 Q. It was that trust, I take it, that cancelled out in your mind even 
the merest possibility that what you 
DO.627 were seeing played out before you could in any way be interpreted 
as suspicious or worse conduct on his 
DO.628 part? 
DO.629 A. Yes. 
 
This narrative largely speaks for itself. In hindsight, Ms Ockwell realises how she 
has been misled by her confidence in Mr Lord's trustworthiness. However, 
caution should be exercised in analysing this particular narrative, because much 
of the cross-examination is leading – e.g., through the use of closed questions 
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that seek a 'yes' or 'no' answer to a proposition. Ms Ockwell agrees with what is 
put to her, but it is not her own words. The most that we can say is that Ms Ockwell 
confirmed under cross-examination that she trusted Mr Lord, and was not inclined 







Chapter 6 – Summary and Conclusions 
 
My primary objective in this thesis has been to describe the phenomenon of 
confirmation bias, and to illustrate the implications of it using a real-life situation. 
 
Chapter 2 introduced human biases and cognitive heuristics generally, as the 
context for my focus on confirmation bias. Chapter 3 describes confirmation bias 
itself, and how we form beliefs that influence our subsequent thinking and 
decision-making. The net effect of this is that the formed belief gains a privilege 
in our minds that may overwhelm a rational assessment of relevant information. 
For example, if we form a belief that a specific person is trustworthy, we may 
dismiss or de-emphasise information that is inconsistent with that belief. 
 
The real-life situation studied here is the sexual abuse of at least 12 boys aged 6 
to 10 over a period of about 2 years, in circumstances where their abuser – 
Jonathan Lord – was a trusted employee of the YMCA, Australia's second largest 
provider of 'outside school hours care' (Royal Commission, 2014, p.22). 
 
Several parents of the abused children, and several of Mr Lord's co-workers, gave 
evidence to the Royal Commission. Chapter 4 introduces discourse analysis as 
the methodology used in this study. The transcripts of the witnesses' evidence 




Several parent witnesses referred to Mr Lord's role as an employee of the YMCA, 
and inferred from this that he was himself trustworthy, for example: (AN, mother 
of victim AO, lines AN.29-30) 
  
"I trusted and believed that if Jonathan Lord was a supervisor at YMCA, he 




The critical word here is "trust", which conveys a broad notion of caring and 
keeping children safe. In at least a couple of cases, parents' confidence in Mr 
Lord as a prospective carer was also bolstered by a recommendation from Mr 
Lord's own mother. Such a recommendation is likely to be a powerful influence, 
because it inherently involves one mother – someone who might be presumed to 
know the qualities of her adult son – speaking directly to another mother. The first 
mother is effectively putting herself forward as an authority figure, and the person 
hearing the recommendation may therefore fall victim to the fallacy argumentum 
ad verecundiam ('fallacious appeals to authority' – see chapter 2). In the case of 
the child AO, his mother (AN) records that Mr Lord's mother Ms Yankos was "very 
proactive in recommending her son to me as a babysitter" (lines AN.26-27). 
 
The victims' mothers were also encouraged by Mr Lord's apparently selfless 
conduct, and the positive reactions of their own children. In one case, Mr Lord 
became "like a member of the family" and would "drop by" and help out (line 
AN.43). Consistently, the children – even some of those who were being abused 
by Mr Lord – extolled his virtues, for example: 
 
• "I understood from speaking with my children that they had grown very 
fond of Jonathan Lord because he made a big effort to entertain them 
and pay them attention" (AU, mother of victim AM, lines AU.23-24). 
 
• "[AO] and other kids appeared to love Jonathan. … [AO] and his friends 
fought about who was going to be on Jonathan's team and who would 
get to ride in Jonathan's car. Jonathan had a way with children" (AN, 
mother of victim AO, lines AN.47-49). 
 
These discourses suggest that parents were lulled into a false sense of security 
through the belief that their children's reactions to Mr Lord would be different if he 
was behaving inappropriately towards them. This connection between Mr Lord 
and the children was also perceived in the context of the parents' "trust" in Mr 
Lord arising from knowing of his involvement with YMCA. In the absence of that 
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basic building block of trust, the parents may perhaps have been more suspicious 
of the attention that Mr Lord paid to the children and his efforts to entertain them. 
This is a fairly classic manifestation of confirmation bias, where subsequent 
information – in this situation, Mr Lord's conduct towards the children and their 
reactions to it – is assessed in terms of beliefs already formed – e.g.., beliefs as 
to a person's trustworthiness. 
 
This was no accident. Just as Mr Lord had a "way with children", he also had a 
way with their parents. As one mother put it: "In hindsight, I now see that Jonathan 
Lord groomed me as well as [my son]" (AN, mother of victim AO, line AN.42). 
 
Mr Lord's co-workers were similarly beguiled by Mr Lord's enthusiasm and 
apparent sincerity: 
 
• "he made me believe that we had this amazing centre" (line DO.581). 
 
• "he came across to parents as a lovely guy" (line DO.582). 
 
• "I just thought he was a great worker and he was very enthusiastic about 
his job and I just thought he had a great passion" (lines CS.325-6). 
 
• "[the] statement that he made to me made me believe that his intentions 
were good and that, in fact, he just wanted to have a positive impact on 
children's lives" (lines AD.811-2). 
 
In this context, words spoken by Mr Lord that might have raised suspicions in the 
minds of someone removed from the situation – e.g., Mr Lord speaking to Ms 
Dellaca of his "soft spot for kids and boys" (lines AD.800-1), and saying "Yeah, I 
love him" to Ms Ockwell when discussing his feelings towards a child he had 
babysat (line DO.243) – did not trigger any concern for co-workers. Even clear 
breaches of YMCA rules were interpreted in a positive light, for example the 
situation observed by Ms Beer where Mr Lord allowed a child to play with his 
107 
 
mobile phone: "It was for a special needs child and the child really loved The 
Wiggles, so it was just The Wiggles on it for him" (lines CB.356-7). 
 
As previously discussed in chapter 5, Ms Beer's interpretation of the breach of 
rules relating to the mobile phone may fall within the scope of argumentum ad 
verecundiam (fallacious appeal to authority) in the sense that Mr Lord could have 
been regarded by Ms Beer as the best authority on what conduct was appropriate 
in the circumstances, or alternatively a negative fallacy ad consequentiam 
(argument based on consequences) – i.e., Ms Beer perceiving the possibility of 
unfair consequences for Mr Lord and the child if the rules were applied strictly. 
However, we are undoubtedly also seeing the primacy effect of confirmation bias, 
where existing beliefs as to the commitment and trustworthiness of Mr Lord 
affected the decision making of these co-workers. This in no way makes them 
accountable for Mr Lord's criminal conduct, but shows how even the most well-
intentioned individuals can be deceived by a manipulative offender. 
 
A significant aspect of confirmation bias is how it affects decision making. In 
relation to parents, the trust that parents invested in Mr Lord led to decisions to 
allow him to babysit their children in some cases, and to allow children to go on 
excursions with him. These decisions were not unreasonable in their context, but 
part of that context – as was the case with the co-workers – was the parents' 
established bias towards regarding Mr Lord as reliable and trustworthy. In some 
cases that bias was encouraged by the children's own endorsement of Mr Lord 
as a person they liked and could relate to. 
 
The extent of the parental and co-worker bias is indicated by how their trust in Mr 
Lord persisted despite incidents and disclosures that in other circumstances may 
have been seen as pointers to the possibility of Mr Lord being a child abuser. In 
the case of co-workers, Ms Ockwell saw Mr Lord hugging children and focusing 
on specific children to the exclusion of others, as well as incidents that she 
regarded as "odd" (Mr Lord having a vacation care child's picture as his phone 
screen-saver – lines DO.234-7) and "strange" (Mr Lord saying he "loved" a child 
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who he babysat – line DO.243). In addition, Ms Ockwell learned that Mr Lord had 
been dismissed by a children's summer camp for being "one on one" with a child, 
but accepted Mr Lord's explanation that (in her words) "he happened to get 
caught just with a child and they didn't approve" (line DO.266). 
 
A similar persistence of belief in Mr Lord's trustworthiness is evident from the 
evidence of AN, mother of victim AO. It appears certain that Mr Lord groomed 
both AO and AN, including taking time to build a connection with AN and showing 
interest in her and her family. By any measure, Mr Lord's engagement with that 
family, including dropping by the home, sharing meals at the home, and spending 
time watching television at the home, went significantly beyond the level of 
contact that would usually occur between a child care worker and the family of a 
child enrolled with the child care service employing the worker. We now (from 
AN's evidence to the Royal Commission) have cause to believe that AO might 
have been sexually abused by Mr Lord on as many as 100 occasions, but AN 
and her family were oblivious to this at the time. Even when Jill Yankos, Mr Lord's 
mother brought him around to AN's home and disclosed that Mr Lord was 
suspended by the YMCA due to an allegation of inappropriate touching, AN 
retained her trust in Mr Lord: 
 
"[I said] How could they make that allegation against you? We need to get 
you a lawyer. There's a guy in Cronulla I can recommend… I still had total 
trust in Jonathan. It never crossed my mind that the alleged inappropriate 
touching could have actually happened... [Jill] asked me to provide a 




This thesis considers a very small aspect of the evidence heard by the Royal 
Commission, and is not intended to be an exhaustive or even comprehensive 
review of the relevant evidence about Mr Lord. My purpose has been to describe 
confirmation bias and illustrate the operation of it in a real-life scenario. My study 
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shows how confirmation bias may lead to tragic or destructive outcomes in some 
circumstances. 
 
Illustration of the primacy effect and other implications of confirmation bias is 
helpful in demonstrating how confirmation bias can operate insidiously to facilitate 
child sexual abuse. The use of discourse analysis in this study has afforded a 
'micro context' understanding of how Mr Lord's abuse of children associated with 
the YMCA service persisted for over a year undetected. While discourse analysis 
does not provide 'black and white' answers to relevant questions, it can 
nonetheless inform theoretical models of behaviour that improve our 
understanding of how such abuse might be detected sooner. 
 
The main focus of the Royal Commission was institutional responses to child 
sexual abuse. Arguably, on the basis of what I have found here, that focus is 
wholly appropriate. There is no doubt that the co-workers and parents who gave 
evidence to the Royal Commission were concerned for the welfare of the children 
involved, and honestly believed that the children were safe, but were individually 
powerless against the deliberate and callous acts of a highly manipulative sexual 
predator. It seems very likely that the safety of children in the context of 
engagement with institutional employees and contractors can only be assured by 
having robust systems to check the bona fides of prospective employees and 
manage their compliance with relevant policies. As can be seen here, even just 
the fact of a person being employed by a reputable institution was enough to 
overcome barriers than might otherwise have improved the safety of children in 
situations outside the scope of the service offered by the institution. This puts an 
onus on such institutions to not only have rules regarding workplace conduct, but 
to also adopt a holistic approach to child safety that recognises the way in which 
the trust of other people is gained and potentially abused. 
 
Accordingly, one path to improving children's safety almost certainly lies in the 
direction of ensuring that institutions involved with the welfare of children 
implement appropriate systemic approaches to protecting children. That said, 
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such approaches will never be enough on their own. Optimal outcomes will only 
be achieved through a combination of systemic approaches and the training of 
individual staff and workers to ensure they understand their individual 
susceptibility to confirmation bias and can recognise abusive situations and 
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Appendix 1 – Royal Commission Terms of Reference, 
Activities and Outputs 
 
The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse was 
established by the appointment of a chair and five other commissioners on 11 
January 2013. The commissioners comprised two judges, a former police 
commissioner, a productivity commissioner, a consultant psychiatrist, and a 
former state senator. The decision to establish the commission was made by the 
Australian federal cabinet on 12 November 2012, and then Prime Minister Julia 
Gillard described the "heartbreaking" character of child sexual abuse (Prime 
Minister, 2012; Cullen, 2012): 
 
"Any instance of child abuse is a vile and evil thing. Australians know that, 
and Australians know from the revelations that they’ve read in recent weeks 
that too many children have suffered child abuse. They have also seen other 
adults let them down. They’ve not only had their trust betrayed by the 
abuser, but other adults that could have acted to assist them have failed to 
do so. There have been revelations of child abusers being moved from 
place to place rather than the nature of their abuse and their crimes being 
dealt with. There have been too many revelations of adults who have 
averted their eyes from this evil. I believe in these circumstances that it’s 
appropriate for there to be a national response through a Royal 
Commission. This I hope will help the healing, but I specifically hope that its 
recommendations will help us ensure that this never ever happens again." 
 
The decision to establish a commission was widely supported, and the Prime 
Minister's announcement was followed by a period of consultation to determine 
the appropriate terms of reference for the commission. Initially funding approved 
for the commission was A$434.1 million (Biddington, 2017). In 2014, the 
commission sought a two year extension, which was estimated to cost A$104 
million (Royal Commission, 2014a, pp.11 & 203). 
 
Terms of reference and program of inquiry 
 
The letters patent formally establishing the commission were 'witnessed' by the 
Governor General of Australia on 11 January 2013 (Letters Patent, per Bryce). 
The initial expectation was that the commission would produce its final report by 
31 December 2015, but this was subsequently extended to 15 December 2017 
(Letters Patent, per Cosgrove). The commission was given a broad brief to 
investigate child sexual abuse in the context of institutions, which does not 
include the institution of the family. The focus of the commission was particularly 
on 'systemic issues' arising in the 'institutional context', which extended to child 
sexual abuse perpetrated by an individual official of an institution where that 
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abuse had been "created, facilitated, increased, or in any way contributed to" by 
the institution or its activities. 
 
In volume 1 of its interim report (Royal Commission, 2014a, p.1) the Royal 
Commission notes the broader brief given to it compared to earlier enquiries 
about child abuse, and describes its three-pronged approach involving private 
sessions with survivors of abuse, public hearings where evidence is heard, and 
research and policy activities – "an extensive research program... [focusing on] 
prevention, identification, response and justice for victims." 'Survivors' and 
'victims' are distinguished as follows (p.31): 
 
"... we use the term ‘victim’ when referring to the person at the time when 
the abuse occurred. We generally use the term ‘survivor’ when discussing 
a person’s experiences after the abuse. This includes when they share their 
story, access support services or seek redress. Where the context is 
unclear, or the discussion is general, we will usually use the term ‘victim’." 
 
The scale of the commission's undertaking is indicated by the number of staff and 
contracted employed, 250 full-time-equivalents mainly based in Sydney (Royal 
Commission, 2014a, p.2). As at 31 May 2014, the commission had conducted 
1,677 private sessions, and by 30 June 2014 there had been 13 public hearings 
in capital cities across Australia (pp.3-4). In the same time frame, 21 research 
projects were completed and over 30 more were in progress or under 
consideration (p.5). 
 
In addition to the "three pillars" of its work – private sessions, hearings and 
research – the commission had the power to refer suspected perpetrators to 
appropriate authorities, and could investigate compensation and other remedies 
for survivors (Royal Commission, 2014a, pp.29-30). Based on the definition in 
Price-Robertson (2012, as cited in Royal Commission), the commission adopted 
the following definition of child sexual abuse (p.31): 
 
"Any act which exposes a child to, or involves a child in, sexual processes 
beyond his or her understanding or contrary to accepted community 
standards. Sexually abusive behaviours can include the fondling of genitals, 
masturbation, oral sex, vaginal or anal penetration by a penis, finger or any 
other object, fondling of breasts, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and exposing the 
child to or involving the child in pornography. It includes child grooming, 
which refers to actions deliberately undertaken with the aim of befriending 
and establishing an emotional connection with a child, to lower the child’s 
inhibitions in preparation for sexual activity with the child." 
 
Many of the witness transcripts considered in this thesis describe the ambiguity 
that may attend adult behaviours towards children, particularly grooming 
behaviours, and the common difficulty of distinguishing between innocent acts of 
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kindness and predatory acts. Acknowledging this difficulty, the commission notes 
that perpetrators of child sexual abuse "manipulate people, processes and 
situations to create opportunities for abuse" which may be more readily available 
when institutions have not established a culture that prioritises child safety (Royal 
Commission, 2014a, p.8). 
 
The hearings held by the commission were organised into thematic case studies, 
generally focusing on a particular institution or individual. In comments at the start 
of the second case study, Justice McClellan the commission chair noted that the 
role of the public hearings was intended to be rather different to the private 
sessions being conducted concurrently: 
 
"Public hearings have a different purpose to Private Sessions. Their primary 
role in this Royal Commission is to provide an opportunity for the 
development of case studies in which there can be an in depth public 
examination of the response of particular institutions to the sexual abuse of 
children within the care of that institution. In addition they enable us to 
publicly tell the story of some individuals who were abused so that we can 
explore the circumstances in which abuse may have occurred and the 
consequences for individuals who have been abused." 
 
Case study 2: Jonathan Lord 
 
Mr Lord was an employee of YMCA's Caringbah branch, providing recreation and 
child care services in Caringbah, just south of Sydney CBD. These services 
included five "Before and After School Care" centres located in five schools in the 
region. 
 
For about two months in 2009, before joining YMCA Caringbah, Mr Lord was a 
"camp counsellor" at a YMCA camp in Virginia, U.S., a role that ended when he 
was found alone in a cabin with a boy in suspicious circumstances. A month after 
being dismissed from the camp in Virginia, Mr Lord applied for a casual position 
with YMCA Caringbah working with children. He claimed falsely that he come 
home early from the Virginia camp "because of a personal family matter." YMCA 
Caringbah did not check his story. 
 
Mr Lord subsequently became a permanent employee at YMCA Caringbah, as 
"Childcare Coordinator" at one of the school-based Before and After School Care 
centres. He also worked at YMCA's creche for a morning or two each week. 
 
Although several witnesses identified concerns about some of Mr Lord's 
behaviours towards children at YMCA, those behaviours were generally capable 
of an innocent explanation. However, with hindsight it was clear that Mr Lord was 
highly manipulative and was engaged actively in grooming both his young 
charges and their parents. His offending included serious molestation of more 
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than a dozen children during excursions and other events operated by YMCA. A 
summary of the specific charges can be found at paragraphs 24 to 50 of the 
opening of Senior Counsel assisting the commission (Furness, 21 October 2013). 
The outcome, after negotiations to finalise the charges to which Mr Lord would 
plead guilty, was a prison sentence of 10 years (6 years non-parole) for 13 
offences committed against 12 children. 
 
Senior Counsel assisting the commission described Mr Lord's popularity under 
the heading "Grooming" (Furness, 21 October 2013): 
 
"72. The Royal Commission will hear evidence that during August 2009 until 
September 2011, Jonathan Lord was highly regarded by his colleagues, the 
parents of the children at the various centres and, apparently by the children 
themselves. Jonathan Lord was described by his colleagues as a 'great 
person to work with' and 'the kids loved him. He was really positive and 
popular. It was more than a job to him, and he put in a lot of effort.' Jonathan 
Lord would 'always make a big effort to make the afternoon tea exciting. It 
was always extravagant and he would buy or bake cakes for the kids.'" 
 
Much of the evidence for this hearing was concerned with the adequacy of 
YMCA's policies, the aftermath of the disclosures, and how YMCA dealt with the 
parents of the abused children. YMCA's actions included requiring its staff to sign 
confidentiality agreements purportedly on "Police instructions" but this was 
denied by NSW Police. The confidentiality agreements included a provision that 
if an employee made an unauthorised disclosure of information about the 
investigation, he or she "may be subject to disciplinary action, including 
termination." 
 
Note: This summary is drawn from the opening address of Senior Counsel 
assisting the commission, and from witness transcripts. 
 
Final Report of the Royal Commission 
 
The Royal Commission's final report comprising 17 volumes was presented to 
the Governor-General of Australia on 15 December 2017. The report catalogues 
the evidence heard by the Royal Commission from 1,302 witnesses during 57 
public hearings spread over 444 hearing days. 
 
The Royal Commission received 1,388 submissions to issues paper and 
consultation papers, and reviewed 1.2 million documents. In addition, the Royal 
Commission held over 6,960 private sessions with survivors of child sexual abuse 
(Royal Commission, 2017, p.4). 
 
In its final report the Royal Commission makes a wide range of recommendations, 




• preventing abuse or, at the very least, identifying it as early as possible 
 
• improving the way perpetrators are investigated, prosecuted and 
sentenced  
 
• improving survivors’ access to justice and ongoing support. 
 
Further information about the Royal Commission, including the whole of its final 









Appendix 2 – Table of Witness Transcripts 
 
This is a list of all witnesses who gave evidence in the Royal Commission's case 
study number 2 that related to Jonathan Lord. The last column indicates the 
witnesses whose evidence has been analysed in this thesis. 
 
 
Identifier Name Category D.A. 
AN "AN" Victim's Parent Yes 
AX "AX" Victim's Parent Yes 
AS "AS" Victim's Parent Yes 
AU "AU" Victim's Parent Yes 
AZ "AZ" Victim's Parent Yes 
AT "AT" Victim's Parent Yes 
AW "AW" Parent of enrolled child No 
AD Alicia Dellaca Current or former YMCA employee Yes 
DO Danielle Ockwell Current or former YMCA employee Yes 
MB Michelle Bates Current or former YMCA employee No 
SO Sheree Ockwell Current or former YMCA employee No 
CB Carine Beer Current or former YMCA employee Yes 
CS Chloe Starr Current or former YMCA employee Yes 
ET Erin Turner Current or former YMCA employee No 
CC Catharine Clements Current or former YMCA employee No 
AM Ann Mary Nolan Current or former YMCA employee No 
JB Jacqui Barnat Current or former YMCA employee No 
LW Liam Whitley Current or former YMCA employee No 
PH Phillip Hare Current or former YMCA employee No 
 
